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JURISDICTION OF APPKLLAJIE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) pursuant to an Order of the Utah Supreme Court entered 
November 1,2010. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the District Court Err in its Interpretation of the Word "Employment" in 
Amendment No. 2 to the Operating Agreement by Concluding as a Matter of 
Law that it Cannot Include Leased Employment? 
Standard of Review: 
The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2001 I IT 50, 
[^16, 84 P.3d 1134. Agreements relating to the ownership ol business entities are 
reviewed under the rules for interpretation of contracts. Dansie, et al v. City of 
Herriman, et al, 2006 UT 23, ffi[5-6, 134 P.3d 1139 (interpreting articles of 
incorporation); Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 200 I II i 28, ^|15, 94 1* Ul 1 <M (applying 
rules of contract interpretation to shareholder agreement). 
Preservation Below: 
This issue was preserved below in Appellant's Motions and Memoranda 
filed in the District Court. (R. 2510-2581, 2682-2689, 6567-6641, 6765-6772.) 
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IL Did the Trial Court Err by Failing to Consider Extrinsic Evidence in 
Determining Whether Amendment No, 2 of the Operating Agreement is 
Ambiguous? 
Standard of Review: 
Determining whether a contract is ambiguous presents a threshold question 
of law which this Court reviews for correctness. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, et al, 
923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996). 
Preservation Below: 
This issue was preserved below in Appellant's Motions and Memoranda 
filed in the District Court. (R. 2510-2581, 2682-2689, 6567-6641, 6765-6772.) 
III. Did the District Court Err in Entering the Order and Judgment Despite 
Genuine Issues of Fact in the Record? 
Standard of Review: 
This Court reviews a District Court's summary judgment ruling for 
correctness. The Court considers only whether the trial court correctly applied the law 
and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed. Kessler v. 
Mortenson, et al, 2000 UT 95, ^|5, 16 P.3d 1225. 
Preservation Below: 
This issue was preserved below in Appellant's Memoranda filed in the 
District Court. (R. 6517-6559.) 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellant ME&LS filed suit below against Bennett and other defendants 
based upon conduct both before and after his resignation. Bennett resigned in August 
2005 and formed his own civil engineering firm in competition with ME&LS, and has 
not worked for ME&LS ever since then. Upon Bennett's resignation, ME&LS asserted 
its right to repurchase his membership interest based upon the ME&LS operating 
agreement. Bennett would not agree to the repurchase, however, and argued he was still 
a member of ME&LS even though he had left to start his own firm. The primary issue in 
this appeal is whether Bennett's resignation of employment triggered his withdrawal as a 
member of ME&LS and the right of ME&LS to repurchase his interest. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Both ME&LS and Bennett filed Motions for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of whether Bennett's resignation of employment triggered his withdrawal as a 
member of ME&LS. The Motions were briefed and argued before the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Ann Boyden. Judge Boyden ruled that 
Bennett did not withdraw as a member by resigning, and entered an Order on 
December 21,2006. (Addendum 4.) 
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Bennett filed a Motion seeking the entry of a final judgment in his favor. In 
the Motion, Bennett argued he did not withdraw as a member of ME&LS upon his 
resignation of employment, and he also sought a share of company profits for time 
periods after he resigned. Judge Brian granted the Motion and entered an Order and 
Judgment on April 3, 2008 (the "Judgment"). (Addendum 5.) 
ME&LS filed its first appeal in April 2008 and this Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision on May 21, 2009 ruling that the Judgment was not final for 
purposes of appeal. (Addendum 6.) 
Upon remand the District Court again ruled that the Judgment is final for 
purposes of appeal, issuing a Minute Entry on September 21, 2010. (Addendum 7.) 
ME&LS filed a Motion to Alter or Amend seeking to ensure that the District Court's 
ruling fully complied with this Court's Memorandum Decision in the prior appeal. The 
District Court then entered an Amended Order Certifying Order and Judgment as Final 
on October 19, 2010, making the findings and ruling required by the Memorandum 
Decision. (Addendum 8.) 
C. Disposition Below. 
The District Court entered the Judgment on April 3, 2008. (Addendum 5.) 
The Judgment was based upon the prior Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008 
which found that Bennett was still a member of ME&LS. The Judgment awarded 
$142,174.93 in favor of Bennett and against ME&LS, "which Bennett claims represents 
his share of cash distributions" from ME&LS. (Addendum 5.) Through the course of 
proceedings described above the District Court entered an Amended Order Certifying 
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Order and Judgment as Final on October 19, 2010 certifying the Judgment as final under 
Rule 54(b) and determining that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the 
Order and Judgment. ME&LS filed its Notice of Appeal on October 20, 2010. 
(Addendum 9.) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A, The McNeil Companies. 
1. In 1983, Scott F. McNeil ("McNeil") formed McNeil Engineering, 
Inc. ("MEI") as a civil and structural engineering firm in Salt Lake City. (R. 2840.) 
McNeil was the sole owner of MEL 
2. In 1996, three limited liability companies were created, including 
ME&LS, to divide and take over the operations of MEI. (R. 6625-6626.) 
3. The business was "divided up into three departments or 
subcompanies ... under the [MEI] umbrella." Afterward, MEI became an administrative 
entity and did not perform engineering services. The staff of MEI performed 
administrative functions for the limited liability companies. (R. 6625, 6627-6628.) 
4. From the beginning ME&LS and the other companies leased all of 
their employees from MEI. Bennett was an employee of MEI who was leased to and 
worked only for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585, 6628.) MEI then had no other role besides 
leasing employees and performing administrative functions. (R. 6628.) 
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B, ME&LS Operating Agreement 
5. In December 1996, each Member of the newly-formed ME&LS, 
including Bennett, signed the Operating Agreement for ME&LS (the "Operating 
Agreement"). (Addendum 1.) (R. 6583, 6615.) 
6. On August 1, 2000, the Members formally amended the Operating 
Agreement by signing Amendment No. 1. The terms of that Amendment are not at issue 
in this appeal. 
7. On November 1, 2001, the Members again revised the Operating 
Agreement by signing Amendment No. 2 (the "Second Amendment"). The Second 
Amendment was signed by all of the Members including Bennett. (Addendum 2 at 4-5.) 
8. The Second Amendment, added new provisions governing the 
dissociation of Members of ME&LS. (Id.) 
9. The Operating Agreement originally provided for the withdrawal of 
a Member only "with the consent of a Majority of the remaining Members ...." 
(Addendum 1, § 12.1(a).) It did not define what would constitute the "withdrawal" of a 
Member of ME&LS. (Addendum 1, Article XII.) 
10. With the Second Amendment, the consent of other Members was no 
longer required for withdrawal. Section 12.1 now provided that a person "shall cease to 
be a Member upon the happening of any of the following events: (a) the withdrawal 
of a Member ...." (Addendum 2 at 2 (emphasis added).) 
6 
11. The Second Amendment also added Section 12.3 describing what 
constitutes the withdrawal of a Member and giving ME&LS an option to purchase a 
withdrawing Member's interest. (Addendum 2 at 3.) 
12. Section 12.3 states: "In the event a Member withdraws from the 
Company prior to the expiration of the Term, the Company ... shall have an option to 
purchase the withdrawing Member's Membership Interest." (Id.) 
13. Section 12.3(a) then provides: "For purposes of this Section, a 
Member shall be deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or 
terminates the Member's employment with the Company for reasons other than 
bankruptcy, death, disability or incompetency." (Id. (emphasis added).) 
14. Section 12.3(b) also states: "The option to purchase a withdrawing 
Member's Membership Interest shall be exercised by giving written notice thereof to the 
withdrawing Member." (Id.) 
15. "The purchase price shall be an amount equal to the book value of 
the Member's Membership Interest in the Company (as defined in Section 11.3.4 
above), to be paid over a period not to exceed five years." (Id. § 12.3(c).) 
16. The Operating Agreement defines the term "Company" as ME&LS. 
(Addendum 1 at 2.) 
B. Bennett's Employment and Resignation. 
17. From the beginning in 1996, ME&LS and the other LLCs leased all 
of their employees from MEI. (R. 6627-6628.) 
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18. Bennett was employed by MEI but was leased to and worked only 
for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585.) Bennett testified that after the limited liability companies 
were formed 'everything ... was supposed to have gone through the LCs, as far as the 
jobs, and ... [MEI] was more of an administration ...." (R. 2569, 6585.) 
19. He testified the purpose of MEI was to keep "the three companies 
together, even though some of us had no interest in the other companies" and also "to 
just continue to keep the employees so that they had their same - the number of years 
that they had worked for a company instead of having to start over with a new company 
...." (R. 6584-6585.) 
20. Bennett concedes that ME&LS provided him with a personal vehicle 
and other benefits, and that he was responsible for directing the work of other leased 
employees of ME&LS. (R. 6586, 6571, 6699.) 
21. The term "employment" as used in Section 12.3(a) is not defined in 
the Operating Agreement or the Second Amendment. (See Addenda 1 and 2.) 
22. By the time Bennett signed the Second Amendment to the Operating 
Agreement on November 1, 2001, he had been a leased employee of ME&LS for about 
5 years. (See Addenda 1 and 2.) 
23. Each other Member of ME&LS who signed the Second Amendment 
also was a leased employee of ME&LS. (R. 6627-6628.) 
24. On August 17, 2005, Bennett submitted a letter of resignation to 
McNeil (the "Resignation Letter"). (See Addendum 3.) The Resignation Letter states 
Bennett resigned voluntarily to "pursue other options." (Addendum 3 at 1.) 
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25. Bennett has not worked for ME&LS or any of the McNeil 
companies since his resignation in August 2005. (R. 6588.) 
26. The Resignation Letter indicates Bennett expected the repurchase of 
his membership interest in ME&LS following his resignation. It states: "Due to the fact 
that I have contributed so much in building up the Company over the years, I feel it fair 
that I receive at least current book value for my 252 interests ... in a timely 
manner." (Addendum 3 at 2 (emphasis added).) 
C. Bennett's Membership Interest. 
27. At the creation of ME&LS, Bennett received an ownership interest 
and became a Managing Member. He began with a 25% interest for which he paid 
$250, or $1 per share. (Addendum 1 at Ex. A; R. 6616.) His percentage was later 
increased to 26.53%. (R. 6698.) 
28. Bennett had no ownership interest in MEI or any other McNeil 
company besides ME&LS. (R. 2580.) 
29. Pursuant to Section 12.3 of the Second Amendment, ME&LS 
exercised its option to repurchase Bennett's membership interest after he resigned. 
(R. 2577-2578.) 
30. Bennett rejected the offer and asserted his resignation did not trigger 
withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS. (R. 2580-2581.) 
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D. December 21, 2006 Order on Cross Motions. 
31. ME&LS filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking the 
District Court to rule that when Bennett resigned and terminated his leased employment 
with ME&LS, he withdrew as a Member. (R. 2510-2581.) 
32. Bennett filed a Cross Motion arguing he resigned only from MEI, 
not ME&LS, and therefore did not withdraw as a Member of ME&LS. (R. 2585-2644.) 
33. On December 21, 2006, the District Court entered an Order ruling 
that Bennett did not withdraw from ME&LS and was still a member. The Order states 
that the Members of ME&LS "intended the term 'employment' to refer only to 
employment specifically with ME&LS, and that the parties did not intend the term to be 
broad enough to include employees leased from other businesses." (Addendum 4.) 
E. The Judgment. 
34. On January 7, 2008, Bennett filed a Motion asking the Court to enter 
judgment against ME&LS "as to the amounts of member distributions which were paid 
in the years 2005 and 2006." (R. 6432-6433.) 
35. The Motion argued "there is no 'just reason for delay' in entering 
judgment for the amounts owed to Bennett." (R. 6447.) 
36. ME&LS opposed the Motion by arguing among other things that 
Bennett was not entitled to a share of payments to Members, even if he was still a 
Member of ME&LS. (R. 6517-6527.) 
37. On April 3, 2008, the District Court entered the Judgment in favor of 
Bennett and against ME&LS in the amount of $142,174.93. (Addendum 5.) The 
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Judgment was based upon the District Court's prior Order of December 21, 2006 and 
also its Order of April 2, 2008. 
i. Bennett is Not Entitled to Guaranteed Payments. 
38. In early 2006, a majority of the Members agreed that ME&LS 
profits should be paid to Members based upon "productivity" instead of ownership 
interests. (R. 6520.) 
39. ME&LS asked its accountant, Mark J. Duffin, CPA ("Duffm"), how 
to pay its Members "for services performed" and Duffin recommended the option of 
guaranteed payments. Duffin testified that IRS regulations allow a limited liability 
company to elect to compensate Members by way of "guaranteed payments" based upon 
their service, production, or capital. (R. 6525, 6538-6542.) See 26 U.S.C. §707(c); 26 
C.F.R. §1.707-1(c). 
40. ME&LS made that election in 2006 and all payments to Members 
during 2006 were made as "guaranteed payments." (R. 6523.) 
ii. ME&LS Has Offsetting Damages Claims. 
41. At the hearing on November 17, 2006, when Judge Boy den ruled 
Bennett was still a Member, the District Court declined to make an award of any other 
"rights and benefits" as Bennett requested, both because an accounting was ordered and 
"more importantly" because there remained a question of "whether there are any offsets, 
and the other issues that may come up in that accounting." (R. 6893, T. 40-41) 
42. Therefore, the Order of December 21, 2006 does not include an 
award of any rights or benefits of Bennett's membership. (Addendum 4.) 
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43. ME&LS argued that damages from its pending claims "could more 
than offset any amounts that may be due to Bennett." (R. 6526.) 
44. By Order entered January 29, 2008 the District Court found that 
there were material issues of fact which required a trial on the Plaintiffs' claims of 
interference with business relations, breach of the ME&LS Operating Agreement, and 
trademark violations, among others. (R. 6560-6566.) 
45. Plaintiffs retained a damages expert and submitted the required 
expert report and disclosures. Bennett did not depose the expert or designate one of his 
own. ME&LS argued its damages claims at least offset any amounts Bennett claims to 
be owed. (R. 6895, T. 42-43.) 
46. The District Court specifically found that "Defendants did not 
contest Plaintiffs' evidence of damages in their Motion for Summary Judgment. All 
issues related to Plaintiffs' evidence of damages are preserved for trial." (R. 6562.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court adopted an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the 
word "employment" as found in the Second Amendment to the Operating Agreement. 
By interpreting it to exclude leased employment, the District Court ignored the common, 
daily usage of the word. "Employment" is broadly defined and liberally construed in 
Utah law. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah et al, 771 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The District Court's rulings also 
failed to acknowledge that ME&LS is where Bennett performed all of the work that 
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constituted his "employment." It is undisputed that Bennett was leased to and worked 
only for ME&LS. Utah statutory and case law acknowledge the common practice of 
leasing employees among Utah businesses, and the employment of leased employees is 
determined by focusing on the company for whom their work is done. 
The District Court also improperly failed to interpret the Operating 
Agreement and the Second Amendment "in an attempt to harmonize and give effect to all 
of the contract provisions." Nielsen v. O'Reilly, et al9 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992). 
The unduly narrow interpretation on which the Judgment and the underlying Orders is 
based renders most of the Second Amendment meaningless and leads to absurd results. 
Under the District Court's interpretation, for example, the withdrawal provisions of the 
Second Amendment would never have any application and no Member of ME&LS could 
ever withdraw by resigning employment. 
Bennett's resignation was clearly voluntary, and there is no question it 
ended his leased employment and all of his work for ME&LS. Bennett maintains he only 
resigned from MEI, however, and that somehow the resignation did not terminate his 
employment with ME&LS. His strained argument is based on the fundamentally 
illogical premise that he had no "employment with ME&LS" where he did all of his 
work, and had "employment" only with MEI where he did no work. Giving effect to all 
provisions of the Second Amendment, and ignoring none, compels the holding that 
Bennett withdrew as a Member of ME&LS when he resigned on August 17, 2005. 
Considering extrinsic evidence, at least preliminarily, also supports 
ME&LS' interpretation of the Second Amendment. Relevant extrinsic evidence includes 
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the facts that ME&LS always leased all of its employees from MEI, that Bennett and 
each other Member who signed the Second Amendment were working as leased 
employees of ME&LS when they signed it, and that Bennett worked exclusively for 
ME&LS and did no work for MEI. Moreover, Bennett's own resignation letter calls for 
the repurchase of his membership interest, tacitly admitting that his resignation was 
deemed a withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS. 
For those reasons, as more fully explained in the Argument section below, 
this Court should rule that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the Operating 
Agreement and the Second Amendment. The Court should hold that Bennett's 
resignation brought about his withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS, and should reverse 
the Judgment and the underlying Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ME&LS PROPERLY APPEALS THE JUDGMENT 
AND THE UNDERLYING ORDERS. 
ME&LS has properly appealed both the Judgment and the underlying 
Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008. The District Court certified the 
Judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Notice of 
Appeal properly states that the appeal is taken from the Judgment and each of the 
underlying Orders. 
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A. The Judgment is Properly Certified as Final. 
A party may appeal all final orders and judgments from a district court 
except as otherwise provided by law. Powell, et al v. Cannon, et al, 2008 UT 19, ^[11, 
179 P.3d 799; Utah R. App. P. 3(a). A judgment that does not dispose of all claims 
below is still appealable "when the district court certifies [it] as final under rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Powell, 2008 UT 19, f l3 ; see also Bradbury, 
et al v. Valencia, et al, 2000 UT 50, TJ12, 5 P.3d 649; Don Houston, M.D., Inc., et al v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., et al, 933 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three requirements for proper 
certification under Rule 54(b). First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple 
parties to the action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an 
order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the 
action. Third, the trial court in its discretion must make a determination that "there is no 
just reason for delay" of the appeal. Kennecott Corp., et al v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, et al, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991) {quoting Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984)). 
In this case, all three requirements have been satisfied. As indicated above, 
there are multiple claims for relief and multiple parties in this action. Also, the ruling 
upon which the Judgment was entered would be appealable as a final order but for the 
fact that there are claims or parties remaining in the case below. The District Court 
ordered ME&LS to pay $142,174.93 to Bennett by certified check delivered "no later 
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than 5:00 p.m. on April 1, 2008." (Addendum 5.) But for the other claims and parties 
remaining in the case, this would have been a final order appealable without certification. 
Finally, the District Court exercised its discretion and determined that 
appeal of the Judgment should not be delayed. This Court's Memorandum Decision in 
the prior appeal held that the Order and Judgment of April 3, 2008 was not properly 
certified as final under Rule 54(b), and the appeal was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Then the District Court entered an Amended Order Certifying Order 
and Judgment as Final on October 19, 2010 (the "Amended Order"). This Amended 
Order follows the instructions of the Memorandum Decision and the requirements of 
Rule 54(b). It makes the express direction for entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all the claims or parties in this action. It also states: "The Court also 
determines that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the Order and 
Judgment." (Addendum 8.) The Amended Order then makes the determination that the 
operative facts underlying the claims on appeal are separate and distinct from those 
underlying the claims which remain in the District Court. (Addendum 8.) 
For those reasons, this Court should conclude that the Amended Order 
satisfies each of the requirements for proper certification under Rule 54(b). Based 
thereon the Court should hold that the Judgment was properly certified as final and that 
the Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
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B. The Notice of Appeal Properly Identifies the Judgment and the 
Underlying Orders. 
Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the notice 
of appeal "shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from ...." 
Utah R. App. P. 3(d). The Rule generally does not require an appellant to "indicate that 
the appeal also concerns intermediate orders or events that have led to that final 
judgment." Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation Co,, et al, 931 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997); see also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 
303, fflflO-23, 990 P.2d 945 (and several cases cited therein). If a party appeals a final 
judgment that is unrelated to an earlier summary judgment ruling, however, then 
Rule 3(d) requires the notice to explicitly state that the earlier ruling is being appealed, or 
the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over it. Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, et 
ai9 1999 UT 10, ffi[7-9, 977 P.2d 474. 
In this case the Notice of Appeal explicitly states that ME&LS appeals 
from the Judgment and also from the Orders entered December 21, 2006 and April 2, 
2008. (See Addendum 9.) The underlying Orders are related because the Judgment is 
premised on the ruling that Bennett was still a Member of ME&LS. Thus, the Notice of 
Appeal fully complies with the requirements of Rule 3(d) under either the general rule 
stated in Rocky Mountain Irrigation or the exception described in Jensen, This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the Judgment and each of the underlying Orders. 
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POINT II 
BENNETT CEASED TO BE A MEMBER OF ME&LS UPON 
RESIGNING HIS EMPLOYMENT, 
a. Bennett's Employment. 
It is undisputed that from the time ME&LS was created in late 1996, 
Bennett was a leased employee. While technically employed by MEI, Bennett was 
leased to and worked exclusively for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585.) All of ME&LS' 
employees were leased employees. (R. 6627-6628.) Bennett was responsible for 
directing the work of other leased employees of ME&LS. (R. 6571, 6699.) 
Bennett's argument and the District Court's Order focused on the word 
"employment" in Section 12.3(a) of the Second Amendment. {See Addendum 2 at 3; see 
also Addendum 4.) The word "employment" is not defined in the Operating Agreement 
or in the Second Amendment. The District Court's Order narrowly construed it to 
exclude leased employment, and the interpretation was improper for the reasons set forth 
below. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the interpretation of a contract, 
the parties' intentions are controlling." Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowner's Assn., 910 
P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996). "When parties to a contract disagree about the meaning of 
a provision, principles of contract interpretation require us to give effect to the meaning 
intended by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement." Uintah Basin 
Medical Center v. Hardy, M.D., 2005 UT App 92, f 12, 110 P.3d 168. When the contract 
is not ambiguous, the Court determines the intent of the parties from the plain meaning of 
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the contract language. Id. 
Organic documents creating a business entity are interpreted as a contract. 
Dansie, et al v. City ofHerriman, et al, 2006 UT 23, ffi[5-6, 134, P.3d 1139 (articles of 
incorporation); Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, 1ffll3-l4, 94 P.3d 193 
(shareholder agreements); Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Association, 2005 UT App 
327, Tfl4, 120 P.3d 34 (articles of incorporation for non-profit corporation). The 
interpretation of such a contract must make sense based upon the nature of the business 
entity and the person's ownership interest. Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, ^ [16. 
Utah courts have also held that in the construction of contracts and statutes, 
words "which are used in common, daily, non-technical speech, should, in the absence of 
evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such 
daily usage." Mesa Development Co.} Inc. v. Sandy City Corp., 948 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) {quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 
(Utah 1982)). In Mesa Development this Court considered the definition of the word 
"resident" in a standard non-legal dictionary "as a helpful guide to its general meaning." 
Mesa Development, 948 P.2d at 369. 
Here, the word "employment" is a common term used in daily, non-
technical speech. It means the "activity in which one engages or is employed." 
Merriam-Webster OnLine, <http://www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary>. This 
definition supports an interpretation of "employment" that focuses on the work an 
employee performs in his or her job and the company for whom the work is done. The 
common, ordinary meaning of "employment" is not limited to a technical legal 
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relationship the employee may have with a leasing employer for whom he or she does no 
work. Utah case law and statutes hold that the substance of the employment relationship 
is found where the leased employee does his or her work. 
This Court has held in such circumstances that the term '"Employment' is 
broadly defined and liberally construed ...." Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 111 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). In that case, Pro-Benefit leased employees to various clients and the employees 
did their work for those clients. For purposes of the Employment Security Act this Court 
held that the client, and not Pro-Benefit, was the employer of the leased employees. Pro-
Benefit lacked "the requisite decision-making power to qualify as an employer." Id. at 
1113. The client performed all of the essential elements of an employer's role. The 
leased employees were held to be employees of the client where they did all of their 
work, and not employees of Pro-Benefit who was only their technical employer. Id. at 
1113-14. Thus, the client and not Pro-Benefit was responsible for paying unemployment 
contributions for the leased employees. Id. at 1114. 
Various provisions of the Utah Code also treat a leased employee as in the 
employment of the lessee or client where the employee does his or her work. For 
example, the Workers Compensation Act provides that in the case of a "professional 
employer organization," which is often an employee leasing company, "the client ... is 
considered the employer of a covered employee" and is required to secure workers 
compensation benefits for the leased employee. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(3)(a). The 
policy of this statute thus focuses on the "client" company where the leased employees do 
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their work. 
In another context, a Utah statute provides that the term "member" of the 
Utah State Retirement System "includes leased employees within the meaning of 
Section 414(n)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code ...." Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-102(25). 
Thus, leased employees may participate in a retirement system through the government 
entity where they work, even though their technical employer is a leasing company. 
These authorities support the conclusion that the word "employment" 
should be broadly interpreted to mean the work in which Bennett engaged or was 
employed, and should focus on ME&LS where all of his work was done. His 
"employment" under Section 12.3(a) of the Second Amendment thus includes his leased 
employment with ME&LS. 
B. Bennett's Resignation. 
Section 12.1 of the Second Amendment provides that: "A person shall 
cease to be a Member upon the happening of any of the following events: (a) the 
withdrawal of a Member ...." (Addendum 2 at 2 (emphasis added).) Section 12.3(a) 
states: "For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be deemed to withdraw when the 
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's employment with the 
Company fME&LS] for reasons other than bankruptcy, death, disability or 
incompetency." (Id. at 3 (emphasis added).) 
On August 17, 2005, Bennett tendered the Resignation Letter and 
voluntarily resigned his employment in order to "pursue other options." (Addendum 3.) 
Because Bennett was and always had been a leased employee of ME&LS, the resignation 
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"voluntarily ... terminate^]" his leased employment with ME&LS as well as his 
technical employment relationship with MEI. Bennett concedes he no longer worked for 
ME&LS or any other McNeil company after his resignation. (R. 6588.) Before his 
resignation Bennett performed all of his work for ME&LS and did no work for MEI. (R. 
6583-6585.) In fact, Bennett's Resignation Letter states he spent an "incredible" amount 
of time "building the reputation and profitability of McNeil Engineering and Land 
Surveying, L.C." (Addendum 3 at 2; R. 6631.) Bennett said he had "a key role in the 
success of [ME&LS] ever since it has been organized." (Addendum 3 at 1; R. 6630.) 
His work for ME&LS was "employment" because it was the "activity in which [he] 
engage[d] or [was] employed." Merriam-Webster OnLine, <http://www.Merriam-
Webster.com/dictionary>. The word is "broadly defined and liberally construed" in Utah 
law. Pro-Benefit, 111 P.2d at 1113. This Court should broadly and liberally interpret the 
word "employment" in Section 12.3(a) to include Bennett's leased employment at 
ME&LS. (Addendum 2 at 3.) 
It ignores reality to argue, as Bennett does, that his resignation only 
terminated his technical legal relationship with MEI and not his leased employment with 
ME&LS, where all of his work was done. Clearly, all of his work for ME&LS ended 
with his resignation. (R. 6588.) Bennett voluntarily "terminate[d]" his work for ME&LS 
when he resigned from MEI. It also defies logic to maintain, as Bennett does, that he had 
no "employment" with ME&LS where he did all of his work, and had "employment" 
only with MEI where he did no work. Bennett withdrew as a Member of ME&LS when 
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he resigned on August 17, 2005 because the resignation voluntarily terminated his 
employment with ME&LS. 
By its Order of December 21, 2006, the District Court ruled that because 
Bennett was a leased employee he had no "employment" at ME&LS within the meaning 
of Section 12.3, and the provisions of the Second Amendment did not apply. This unduly 
narrow interpretation erroneously excludes leased employees and ignores the undisputed 
fact that ME&LS had nothing but leased employees. (R. 6571, 6699.) These facts were 
known to Bennett and the other Members when they signed the Second Amendment. 
ME&LS had been in business with nothing but leased employees for nearly 5 years by 
the time the Second Amendment was signed, and each Member who signed it was 
himself a leased employee. Moreover, the Order ignores the common practice of 
employee leasing among Utah businesses which is reflected by the authorities cited 
above. This Court should conclude that the District Court's ruling was in error, and 
accordingly should reverse the Orders and the Judgment. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD GIVE EFFECT TO ALL CONTRACT 
PROVISIONS AND IGNORE NONE. 
A. Abundant Utah Case Law. 
It is well established in Utah law that a contract should be interpreted "in an 
attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions." Nielsen v. 
O'Reilly, et aL, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992); Kraatzv. Heritage Imports, et ai9 2003 
UT App 201,1f26, 71 P.3d 188 (same); Chase v. Scott, et aL, 2001 UT App 404, [^20, 38 
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P.3d 1001 (same); Lee, et al v. Barnes, et al, 1999 UT App 126, f l l , 977 P.2d 550. 
"Each contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of 
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) {citing Utah Valley Bank v. 
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981)); Richins Drilling Inc. v. Golf Services 
Group, Inc., et al, 2008 UT App 262, 1(15, 189 P.3d 1280 (the Court should avoid an 
interpretation which would render contract provisions "meaningless") (Davis, J., 
concurring and dissenting). The Court will "presume" that the contract language "was 
included for the purpose stated and ... give [it] effect according to its usual and ordinary 
meaning." Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wright, etal, 770 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (citing Marriot v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 
467 P.2d 981 (1970)). 
Under these rules of construction Utah courts have rejected contract 
interpretations that would render a provision meaningless or create an absurd result. For 
example, in Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, 92 P.3d 768, this 
Court interpreted a contract provision relating to computer source codes. The Court 
rejected the defendant's interpretation of the term "proceeds" because it would "render 
meaningless the deductions portion of the definition of 'Gross Revenue.'" Id. f27. In 
Kraatz, this Court rejected an interpretation of the term "costs" which "would reduce the 
costs and fees recovery provision 'to absurdity.'" Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201, ^[26-28. 
The interpretation "would render other parts of the contract meaningless." Id. f32. 
Finally, in Okelberry, the Court rejected the plaintiffs interpretation that every time 
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cattle die or are sold the shareholder would lose shares, and every time a calf is bom the 
shareholder would gain shares. The Court stated: "The corporate secretary would be 
voiding and issuing shares on a daily basis. We may not endorse such an absurd 
interpretation^ Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, |^24 (emphasis added). 
B. Cafe Rio. 
In the recent decision of Cafe Rio, Inc., et al v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 
LLC, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 1235, the Utah Supreme Court applied this rule of 
construction to interpret a cross-easement agreement. The case illustrates how Utah 
courts apply the rule to resolve competing interpretations of contract language. Larkin-
Gifford-Overton ("LGO") owned a parcel of commercial property in St. George, Utah. 
The VeraR. Hughes Grandchildren's Trust (the "Trust") owned an adjacent parcel, of 
which Cafe Rio was a tenant. LGO, the Trust, and four other adjacent property owners 
signed a cross-easement agreement establishing open space in the center of the six 
parcels as common areas and governing the use of those common areas. Cafe Rio, 2009 
UT 27, 6,1Hf8-l0. Later, LGO began constructing a new building on its parcel. Cafe Rio 
and the Trust filed suit to enjoin the construction claiming it was an "obstruction" 
prohibited by the cross-easement agreement. {Id. |^14.) The district court granted 
summary judgment for the Trust and Cafe Rio, interpreting the cross-easement agreement 
to prohibit LGO's building construction. (Id. ^17.) 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the judgment below. 
Construing multiple provisions of the cross-easement agreement, the Court ruled that it 
must "'consider each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view 
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toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, [^25 {quoting 
Green River Canal Co, v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, [^17, 84 P.3d 1134). Interpreting the word 
'"obstruction' to include buildings would eviscerate LGO's ability to construct a building 
on Parcel 5 - a right explicitly bargained and provided for. We will not interpret a 
general contractual term such that it renders an explicit right meaningless'' Cafe Rio, 
2009 UT 27, T[33 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment was reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of LGO. 
(/J. 1|38.) 
In the present case, the ruling in Cafe Rio applies with equal force. To 
accept Bennett's narrow interpretation of "employment," as the District Court did, 
eliminates the possibility of withdrawal upon a Member's resignation and would do away 
with ME&LS' right to repurchase that Member's interest. These are explicit rights 
bargained for in the Operating Agreement and the Second Amendment. Following the 
Supreme Court's guidance, this Court should not "interpret a general contractual term 
[employment] such that it renders an explicit right meaningless." Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, 
1f33. 
C. The Second Amendment. 
Applying these rules of construction to the Second Amendment requires 
reversal of the Judgment and the underlying Orders. The District Court's interpretation 
of the word "employment" to exclude leased employment renders most of the Second 
Amendment meaningless. The decision nullifies parts of Sections 12.1 and 12.2 and 
nearly all of Section 12.3 by holding they do not apply to leased employees. 
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(Addendum 4; R. 3121.) The obvious intent of the withdrawal provisions in 
Sections 12.1 and 12.3 was to create a mechanism for ME&LS to break ties with a 
Member who resigns and to provide for repurchase of the Member's interest. Bennett 
does not dispute that this was the intended purpose. (R. 6697-6708.) The language 
plainly shows the Members intended withdrawal to occur upon resignation; in fact, 
resignation was the primary event that would trigger withdrawal. (Addendum 2 at 3.) 
Under the District Court's ruling, however, no Member could ever withdraw from 
ME&LS by resigning. Narrowly construing the word "employment" to exclude leased 
employment thus frustrates the intended purpose of the Second Amendment. 
Moreover, the District Court's ruling leads to the absurd result that the 
Second Amendment could never apply to the Members of ME&LS, the very people for 
whom it was written. The only kind of "employment" anyone ever had with ME&LS 
was leased employment. Bennett admits he worked exclusively for ME&LS as a leased 
employee (R. 6583-6585) but contends he had no "employment" with the company.1 If a 
leased employee had no "employment" then no one ever had "employment" at ME&LS, 
and no Member would ever withdraw from ME&LS by voluntary resignation. Thus, the 
Second Amendment would become a wasted and futile effort. 
The District Court's ruling also leads to the absurd result of Bennett 
remaining a Member after he chose to leave and form his own engineering firm in 
1
 Bennett makes the illogical argument that "a member who was employed by ME&LS 
directly could resign membership by resigning employment." (R. 6705.) Yet that 
argument flies in the face of Bennett's admission that all ME&LS employees were leased 
employees and no one was ever employed "directly" by ME&LS. (R. 2569, 6583-6585, 
6627-6628.) 
27 
competition with ME&LS. It allows Bennett to keep one foot on each side of the fence, 
by earning profits from his own new firm and still demanding a share of profits from 
ME&LS. This result is flatly contrary to Bennett's intent and that of other Members as 
reflected in the language of Section 12.3 of the Second Amendment. (Addendum 2 at 3.) 
The Resignation Letter states Bennett's intent by including his request that ME&LS 
repurchase his membership interest. (Addendum 3 at 2.) 
It is significant to note that Section 12.3 did not exist in the original 
Operating Agreement. (See Addendum 1.) That document has only one brief reference 
to withdrawal of a Member in Section 12.1, which required a majority consent of the 
Members. (Id) Some five years after ME&LS was formed, however, all Members 
including Bennett signed the Second Amendment which added Section 12.3 and created a 
process for withdrawal "when the Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the 
Member's employment with the Company ...." (Addendum 2, § 12.3(a).) Under 
Bennett's argument, they signed a contract that could never have any effect. They 
provided for the resignation of "employment" from a company which, under Bennett's 
theory, had no "employment" whatsoever. Bennett's interpretation, as adopted in the 
Orders and the Judgment, renders Section 12.3 meaningless and of no effect. 
By contrast, ME&LS' interpretation would give effect to all provisions of 
the Operating Agreement and the Second Amendment. Its interpretation is that the word 
"employment" was meant to include "leased employment" because that is the only kind 
of employment anyone ever had with ME&LS. This interpretation gives effect to all 
contract provisions and ignores none. Withdrawal is possible as the Members 
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contemplated when a voluntary resignation terminates the Member's employment. The 
repurchase of the Member's interest would then occur as the Second Amendment 
provides. No provision of the Operating Agreement or the Second Amendment is 
rendered meaningless by this interpretation and there will be no absurd result. Under 
established Utah law, therefore, the Court should adopt this interpretation and rule that 
the word "employment" includes Bennett's leased employment and that the resignation 
triggered his withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS. 
POINT IV 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT 
"EMPLOYMENT" INCLUDES LEASED EMPLOYMENT. 
If the question cannot be resolved within the four corners of the contract, 
then the Court should consider extrinsic evidence about the meaning of the word 
"employment." The issue of whether a contract is ambiguous is decided by the Court as 
a matter of law. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, <[|13. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. Fair bourn Commercial Inc. v. 
American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, f^lO, 94 P.3d 292 {citing Winegarv. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)). 
However, a contract provision is not ambiguous just because one party 
gives that provision a different meaning than another party does. To demonstrate 
ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties each much be "tenable." The Canopy 
Group, 2004 UT App 162, f24. To be tenable, an interpretation must make sense in light 
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of the facts surrounding the creation of the contract and the nature of the organization 
involved. See Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, \ 16; Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, |12. The 
Court should avoid finding ambiguities as the result of a "forced or strained construction" 
of the contract. Utah Transit Authority v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., Inc., 
2006 UT App 46, f 12, 131 P.3d 288. 
Moreover, "[a] construction given to a contractual provision by the acts and 
conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as 
to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will when reasonable, be adopted and 
enforced by the court." Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, f l6. 
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous the Court is not bound to 
consider only the language of the contract itself. Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., et al, 
2002 UT 43, [^19, 48 P.3d 918. Any relevant evidence must be considered so the Court 
can place itself in the same situation the parties found themselves at the time of 
contracting. Id. (citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
1995)). "The only evidence relevant to that inquiry is evidence of facts known to the 
parties at the time they entered the [agreement]." Year gin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 2001 UT 11, [^39, 20 P.3d 287. 
In this case, to decide whether the word "employment" is ambiguous, the 
Court should consider at least the following relevant evidence known to the parties at the 
time the Second Amendment was signed: 
1. From its inception ME&LS leased all of its employees from MEL 
Thus, the only kind of "employment" ME&LS ever had was leased employment. 
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2. Bennett and each other Member of ME&LS who signed the Second 
Amendment were working as leased employees of ME&LS at the time of contracting, 
and had been for nearly 5 years. 
3. Bennett worked exclusively for ME&LS and did no work for MEL 
4. All of the employees worked for the limited liability companies and 
not for MEL Bennett testified "everything ... was supposed to have gone through the 
LCs, as far as the jobs, and that [MEI] was more of an administration ...." (R. 2569, 
6585.) 
5. Bennett was responsible for directing other leased employees of 
ME&LS. 
In light of these facts known to the parties when they signed the Second 
Amendment, this Court may easily hold that the word "employment" includes Bennett's 
leased employment with ME&LS. Because each Member of ME&LS was a leased 
employee, it is unreasonable to suggest they meant the word "employment" to exclude 
leased employment. Bennett's attempt to narrow the general meaning of the word 
"employment" to exclude leased employment would strain its interpretation beyond 
anything possibly intended by the Members. 
Moreover, a construction given to a contract provision "by the acts and 
conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as 
to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will when reasonable, be adopted and 
enforced by the Court." Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, [^16. Here, Bennett's Resignation 
Letter reveals that he in fact believed his resignation was a withdrawal which required the 
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repurchase of his membership interest. The Resignation Letter states Bennett expected to 
"receive at least current book value for my 252 interests ... in a timely manner." 
(Addendum 3 at 2.) By that statement Bennett tacitly admits he was resigning or 
terminating his employment with ME&LS which he knew would give ME&LS the option 
to repurchase his membership interest. No other event had occurred besides his 
resignation which could bring about his "dissociation" as a Member, e.g., bankruptcy, 
expulsion, death, or disability. (Addendum 2, § 12.1.) Nothing else could trigger the 
repurchase of Bennett's membership interest except his withdrawal by resignation. 
Giving "great weight" to this statement supports the conclusion that Bennett understood 
his resignation terminated his employment with ME&LS. 
For those reasons, the consideration of extrinsic evidence supports the 
interpretation that the word "employment" includes Bennett's leased employment with 
ME&LS. After considering this extrinsic evidence, the Court should conclude that 
ME&LS' interpretation is reasonably supported by the language of the Second 
Amendment, and that the evidence is admissible to resolve conflicting interpretations of 
the word "employment." The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, [^19, 48 P.3d 918 {quoting 
Ward, 907 P.2d at 268). 
D. Alternatively, the Issue Should be Remanded for Trial. 
In the alternative, if the Court finds there are issues of fact with respect to 
the Members' intent concerning the Operating Agreement and the Second Amendment, 
then the Court should reverse the Judgment and the Orders accordingly. If this Court 
concludes there are genuine issues of material fact as to the meaning of term 
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"employment" in the Second Amendment, then the Court should reverse the Judgment 
and the underlying Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008 as improperly entered 
under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue of whether Bennett 
withdrew as a Member of ME&LS then should be remanded for trial 
POINT V 
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT. 
If the Court affirms the District Court's interpretation of the word 
"employment," as set forth in the Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008, the 
Court nevertheless should hold that the District Court improperly entered the Judgment 
because of genuine issues of fact in the record. The Judgment was entered upon 
Bennett's motion and not after an evidentiary hearing or trial. Accordingly, it should be 
reviewed under the standards for summary judgments in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The Judgment should be reversed for at least two reasons. First, the record 
contains genuine issues of material fact as to whether Bennett is entitled to the amount 
awarded, even if he is determined to be a Member of ME&LS. Most of the amount 
awarded in the Judgment is a share of "guaranteed payments" that ME&LS made to its 
Members in 2006, and Bennett was not entitled to a share of such guaranteed payments. 
In January 2006, shortly after Bennett left ME&LS, the Members agreed 
that profits of the company should be paid based on "productivity" instead of ownership 
interest. (R. 6530-6532.) Duffm advised ME&LS that tax law allows an LLC to pay 
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guaranteed payments to its Members based on their service, production, or capital. 
(R. 6538-6542.) A "guaranteed payment" is a payment made by a partnership to a 
partner for services or the use of capital and is determined without regard to the income 
of the partnership.2 See 26 U.S.C. § 707; see also 26 C.F.R. §1.707-1 (c). ME&LS 
wanted to make guaranteed payments to the people who were performing services for the 
company. (R. 6543-6546.) Because Bennett had left and was no longer performing 
services for ME&LS, he was not entitled to a share of guaranteed payments. 
Second, any amount Bennett may claim as a share of distributions or 
guaranteed payments is subject to an offset by the damages claims of ME&LS against 
Bennett. Following the hearing held December 11, 2007 and the District Court's Order 
of January 29, 2008, ME&LS has damages claims pending against Bennett which require 
a trial on the merits. The District Court ruled that those claims present genuine issues of 
fact which must be resolved by the jury. The District Court also acknowledged that 
Bennett did not contest Plaintiffs' evidence of damages arising from these claims. 
(R. 6562.) Damages based upon those claims could more than offset any amounts that 
may be due to Bennett. 
Therefore, even if this Court concludes Bennett is still a Member of 
ME&LS, the Court should reverse the Judgment and remand for a trial on the issues of 
whether Bennett is entitled to a share of guaranteed payments made by ME&LS after 
2
 A limited liability company may elect to be taxed as a corporation, an S-corporation, or 
a partnership. ME&LS elected to be taxed as a partnership. (R. 5293-5294.) 
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Bennett's resignation, and whether any such amount would be offset by ME&LS' 
damages claims against Bennett. 
CONCLUSION 
For those reasons, the Court should apply governing principles of Utah 
contract law by interpreting the common, ordinary meaning of the word "employment," 
and by giving effect to all provisions of the Operating Agreement and the Second 
Amendment and ignoring none of them. The Court should consider extrinsic evidence in 
its review, at least preliminarily. The Court should then conclude that Bennett's 
resignation terminated his leased employment with ME&LS and triggered his withdrawal 
as a Member. Based thereon, the Court should reverse the Judgment and the Orders of 
December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the 
Judgment because there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Bennett is entitled to a 
share of guaranteed payments made to ME&LS Members, and as to whether any such 
amount would be offset by ME&LS' damages claims against Bennett. 
DATED this _2"day of February, 2011. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
kXTTHEW C. ^ S J E C K ^ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 1 
OPERATING AGREEMENT 
OF 
McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC 
This Operating Agreement of McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, 
L.C., a limited liability company organized pursuant to the Utah Limited Liability Company 
Act, is entered into and shall be effective as of the Effective Date, by and among the Company 
and the persons executing this Agreement as Members. 
ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of this Operating Agreement (as defined below), unless the context 
clearly indicates otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings: 
1.1 Act - The Utah Limited Liability Company Act and all amendments to the 
Act. 
1.2 Additional Member - A Member other than an Initial Member or a Substitute 
Member who has acquired a Membership Interest from the Company. 
L3 Admission Agreement - The Agreement between an Additional Member and 
the Company described in Article XIII. 
1.4 Articles - The Articles of Organization of the Company as properly adopted 
and amended from time to time by the Members and filed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code. 
1.5 Assignee - A transferee of a Membership Interest who has not been admitted 
as a Substituted Member. 
1.6 Bankrupt Member - A member who: (a) has become the subject of an Order 
for Relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code, (b) has initiated, either in an 
original Proceeding or by way of answer in any state insolvency or receivership 
proceeding, an action for liquidation arrangement, composition, readjustment, 
dissolution, or similar relief. 
1.7 Capital Account - The account maintained for a Member or Assignee 
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determined in accordance with Article VIIL 
L8 Capital Contribution - Any contribution of Property, services or the 
obligation to contribute Property or services made by or on behalf of a Member or 
Assignee. 
1.9 Code - The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended from time to time. 
1.10 Company - McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC, a 
limited liability companyformed under the laws of Utah, and any successor limited 
liability company. 
1.11 Operating Agreement - This Operating Agreement including all Admission 
Agreements and amendments adopted in accordance with the Operating Agreement and 
the Act. 
1.12 Company Liability - Any enforceable debt or obligation for which the 
Company is liable or which is secured by any Company Property. 
1.13 Company Minimum Gain - An amount determined by first computing for 
each Company Nonrecourse Liability any gain the Company would realize if it 
disposed of the Company Property subject to that liability for no consideration other 
than full satisfaction of the liability, and then aggregating the separately computed 
gains. The amount of Company Minimum Gain includes such minimum gain arising 
from a conversion, refinancing, or other change to a debt instrument, only to the extent 
a Member is allocated a share of that minimum gain. For any Taxable Year, the net 
increase or decrease in Company Minimum Gain is determined by comparing the 
Company Minimum Gain on the last day of the immediately preceding Taxable Year 
with the Minimum Gain on the last day of the current Taxable Year. Notwithstanding 
any provision to the contrary contained herein, Company Minimum Gain and increases 
and decreases in Company Minimum Gain are intended to be computed in accordance 
with §704 of the Code the Regulations issued thereunder, as the same may be issued 
and interpreted from time to time. A Members share of Company Minimum Gain at 
the end of any Taxable Year equals: the sum of Nonrecourse Deductions allocated to 
that Member (and to that Member's predecessors in interest) up to that time and the 
distributions made to that Member predecessors in interest) up to that time and the 
distributions made to that Member (and to that Member's predecessors in interest) up to 
that time of proceeds of a nonrecourse liability allocable to an increase in Company 
Minimum Gain minus the sum of that Member's (and that Member's predecessors' in 
interest) aggregate share of the net decreases in Company Minimum Gain plus their 
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aggregate share of decreases resulting from revaluations of Company Property subject 
to one or more Company Nonrecourse Liabilities. 
1.14 Company Nonrecourse Liability - A company Liability to the extent that no 
Member or Related Person bears the economic risk of loss (as defined in §1.752-2 of 
the Regulations) with respect to the liability. 
1.15 Default Interest Rate - The then-current prime rate quoted by the largest 
commercial bank in the jurisdiction of the Principal Office plus two percent. 
1.16 Distribution - A transfer of Property to a member on account of a 
Membership Interest as described in Article IX. 
1.17 Disposition (Dispose) - Any sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, mortgage, 
pledge, grant hypothecation, or other transfer, absolute or as security or encumbrance 
(including dispositions by operation of law). 
1.18 Dissociation - Any action which causes a Person to cease to be Member as 
described in Article XII hereof. 
1.19 Dissolution Event - An event, the occurrence of which will result in the 
dissolution of the Company under Article XIV unless the Members agree to the 
contrary. 
1.20 Effective Date - January 1, 1997. 
\y\ Immediate Family - A Member's Immediate Family includes the Member's 
spouse, children (including natural, adopted and stepchildren), grandchildren, parents, 
and siblings. 
1.22 Initial Capital Contribution - The Capital Contribution agreed to be made by 
the Initial Members as described in Article VIII. 
1.23 Initial Members - Those persons identified on Exhibit A attached hereto and 
made a part hereof by this reference who have executed this Operating Agreement. 
1.24 Majority - The affirmative vote or consent of Members described as a 
"Majority" in Article VI hereof. 
1.25 Management Right - The right of a Member to participate in the management 
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of the Company, including the rights to information and to consent or approve actions 
of the Company. 
1.26 Managers - Two Members selected to manage the affairs of the Company under 
Article VII hereof. 
1.27 Member - Initial Member, Substituted Member or Additional Member, and, 
unless the context expressly indicates to the contrary, includes Managers and 
Assignees. 
1.28 Member Minimum Gain - An amount determined by first computing for each 
Member Nonrecourse Liability any gain the Company would realize if it disposed of 
the Company Property subject to that liability for no consideration other than full 
satisfaction of the liability, and then aggregating the separately computed gains. The 
amount of Member Minimum Gain includes such minimum gain arising from a 
conversion, refinancing, or other change to a debt instrument, only to the extent a 
Member is allocated a share of that minimum gain. For any Taxable Year, the net 
increase or decrease in member Minimum Gain is determined by comparing the 
Member Minimum Gain on the last day of the immediately preceding Taxable Year 
with the Minimum Gain on the last day of the current Taxable Year. Notwithstanding 
any provision to the contrary contained herein, Member Minimum Gain and increases 
and decreases in member Minimum Gain are intended to be computed in accordance 
with §704 of the Code the Regulations issued thereunder, as the same may be issued 
and interpreted from time to time. 
1.29 Member Nonrecourse Liability- Any Company Liability to the extent the 
liability is nonrecourse under state law, and on which a Member or Related Person 
bears the economic risk of loss under §1.752-2 of the Code because, for example, the 
Member or Related Person is the creditor or a guarantor. 
1.30 Membership Interest - The rights of a Member or, in the case of an 
Assignee, the rights of the assigning Member in Distributions (liquidating or otherwise) 
and allocations of the profits, losses, gains, deductions, and credits of the Company. 
1.31 Net Losses - The losses and deductions of the Company determined in 
accordance with accounting principles consistently applied from year to year employed 
under the method of accounting adopted by the Company and as reported separately or 
in the aggregate, as appropriate, on the tax return of the Company filed for federal 
income tax purposes. 
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1.32 Net Profits - The income and gains of the Company determined in accordance 
with accounting principles consistently applied from year to year employed under the 
method of accounting adopted by the Company and as reported separately or in the 
aggregate, as appropriate, on the tax return of the Company filed for federal income 
tax purposes. 
1.33 Nonrecourse Liabilities - Nonrecourse liabilities include Company 
Nonrecourse Liabilities and Member Nonrecourse Liabilities. 
1.34 Notice - Notice shall be in writing. Notice to the Company shall be 
considered given when mailed by first class mail postage prepaid addressed to the 
Managers in care of the Company at the address of Principal Office. Notice to a 
Member shall be considered given when mailed by first class mail postage prepaid 
addressed to the Member at the address reflected in the Operating Agreement, unless 
the Member has given the Company a Notice of a different address. 
1.35 Offsettable Decrease - Any allocation that unexpectedly causes or increases a 
deficit in the Members Capital Account as of the end of the taxable year to which the 
allocation relates attributable to depletion allowances under §1.704(b)(2)(iv)(k) of the 
Regulations, allocations of loss and deductions under §§704(e)(2) or 706 of the Code or 
under §1.751-1 of the Regulations, or distributions that, as of the end of the year are 
reasonably expected to be made to the extent they exceed the offsetting increases to 
such Members Capital Account that reasonably are expected to occur during (or prior 
to) the taxable years in which the such distributions are expected to be made (other than 
increases pursuant to a Minimum Gain Chargeback). 
1.36 Organization - A Person other than a natural person. Organization includes, 
without limitation, corporations (both non-profit and other corporations), partnerships 
(both limited and general), joint ventures, limited liability companies, grantor trusts 
and unincorporated associations, but the term does not include joint tenancies and 
tenancies by the entirety. 
1.37 Organization Expenses - Those expenses incurred in the organization of the 
Company including the costs of preparation of the Operating Agreement and Articles. 
1 ^ ^ Permitted Transferee - Any member of the Member's Immediate Family, or 
an Organization controlled by such Member or by members of the Member's 
Immediate Family. 
1.39 Person - An individual, trust, estate, or any incorporated or unincorporated 
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organization permitted to be a member of a limited liability company under the laws of 
Utah. 
1.40 Proceeding - Any administrative, judicial, or other adversary proceeding, 
including, without limitation, litigation, arbitration, administrative adjudication, 
mediation, and appeal or review of any of the foregoing. 
1.41 Property - Any property real or personal, tangible or intangible, including 
money and any legal or equitable interest in such property, but excluding services and 
promises to perform services in the future. 
1.42 Regulations - Except where the context indicates otherwise, the permanent, 
temporary, proposed, or proposed and temporary regulations of Department of the 
Treasury under the Code as such regulations may be lawfully changed from time to 
time. 
1.43 Related Person - A person having a relationship to a Member that is described 
in §1.752-4(b) of the Regulations. 
1.44 Sharing Ratio - With respect to any Member, a fraction (expressed as a 
percentage), the numerator of which is the total of the Member's Capital Account and 
the denominator is the total of all Capital Accounts of all Members and Assignees. 
1.45 Substitute Member - An assignee who has been admitted to all of the rights 
of membership pursuant to the Operating Agreement. 
1.46 Taxable Year - The taxable year of the Company as determined pursuant to 
§706 of the Code. 
1.47 Taxing Jurisdiction - Any state, local, or foreign government that collects 
tax, interest or penalties, however designated, on any member's share of the income or 
gain attributable to the Company. 
ARTICLE H 
FORMATION 
2.1 Organization - The Members hereby organize the Company as a Utah limited 
liability company pursuant to the provisions of the Act. 
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2.2 Agreement - For and in consideration of the mutual covenants herein 
contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which is hereby acknowledged, the Members executing this Operating Agreement 
hereby agree to the terms and conditions of the Operating Agreement, as it may from 
time to time be amended according to its terms. It is the express intention of the 
Members that the Operating Agreement shall be the sole source of agreement of the 
parties, and, except to the extent a provision of the Operating Agreement expressly 
incorporates federal income tax rules by reference to sections of the Code or 
Regulations or is expressly prohibited or ineffective under the Act, the Operating 
Agreement shall govern, even when inconsistent with, or different than, the provisions 
of the Act or any other law or rule. To the extent any provision of the Operating 
Agreement is prohibited or ineffective under the Act, the Operating Agreement shall be 
considered amended to the smallest degree possible in order to make the agreement 
effective under the Act. In the event the Act is subsequently amended or interpreted in 
such a way to make any provision of the Operating Agreement that was formerly 
invalid valid, such provision shall be considered to be valid from the effective date of 
such interpretation of amendment. 
2.3 Name - The name of the Company is McNEBL ENGINEERING AND LAND 
SURVEYING, LC. 
2.4 Effective Date -This Operating Agreement shall become effective upon the 
Effective Date, as defined in Article I. 
2.5 Term - The Company shall be dissolved and its affairs wound up in 
accordance with the Act and the Operating Agreement on December 31, 2036, unless 
the term shall be extended by amendment to the Operating Agreement and the Articles 
of Organization, or unless the Company shall be sooner dissolved and its affairs wound 
up in accordance with the Act or the Operating Agreement. 
2.6 Registered Agent and Office - The name and street address of the initial 
agent for service of process required to be maintained by the Act is: Scott F. McNeil, 
6895 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah 84047. The Managers, may, from time to time, 
change the registered agent or office through appropriate filings with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code. 
2.7 Principal Office - The Principal Office of the Company shall be located at: 
6895 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah 84047. 
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ARTICLE m 
NATURE OF BUSINESS 
The purpose of this Company is to engage in the business of providing civil 
engineering and land surveying services and all related activities and any other lawful business 
agreed by a Majority of the Members. 
ARTICLE IV 
ACCOUNTING AND RECORDS 
4.1 Records to be Maintained - The Company shall maintain the following 
records at the Principal Office: 
4.1.1 A current list in alphabetical order of the full name and last 
known business street address of each Member; 
4.1.2 A copy of the Articles of Organization and all certificates of 
amendment thereto, together with executed copies of any powers of 
attorney pursuant to which any certificate of amendment has been 
executed; 
4.1.3 Copies of the Company's federal, state and local income tax 
returns and reports, if any, for the three most recent years; 
4.1.4 Copies of the Operating Agreement including all amendments 
thereto; 
4.1.5 Any financial statements of the Company for the three most 
recent years; 
4.L6 A writing or other data compilation from which information 
can be obtained through retrieval devices into reasonably usable form 
setting forth the following: 
(a) the amount of cash and a description and 
statement of the agreed value of the other property or 
services contributed by each Member and which each 
Member has agreed to contribute; 
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(b) the times at which or events on the happening of 
which any additional contributions agreed to be made by 
each Member are to be made; 
(c) any right of a Member to receive distributions 
which include a return of all or any part of the Member's 
Capital Contribution; and 
(d) any events upon the happening of which the 
Company is to be dissolved and its affairs wound up, 
4.2 Reports to Members: 
4.2.1 The Managers shall provide reports at least annually to the 
Members other than Assignees at such time and in such manner as the 
Managers may determine reasonable. 
4.2.2. The Managers shall provide all Members with those 
information returns required by the Code and the Act. 
4.3 Accounts - The Managers shall maintain a record of Capital Account for 
each Member in accordance with Article VIII. 
ARTICLE V 
NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF MEMBERS 
The names and addresses of the Initial Members are as reflected on Exhibit A attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
ARTICLE VI 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS 
6.1 Management Rights - All Members (other than Assignees) who have 
not Dissociated shall be entitled to vote on any matter submitted to a vote of the 
Members. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following actions require the 
consent of a Majority of the Members: 
(a) any amendment to this Operating Agreement; 
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(b) the admission of Assignees to Management Rights; and 
(c) the continuation of the Company after a Dissolution Event. 
6.2 Majority - Whenever any matter is required or allowed to be approved 
by a Majority of the Members or a Majority of the Remaining Members under 
the Act or the Operating Agreement, such matter shall be considered approved 
or consented to upon the receipt of the affirmative approval or consent, either in 
writing or at a meeting of the Members, of Members having Sharing Ratios in 
excess of one half of the Sharing Ratios of all the Members entitled to vote on a 
particular matter. Assignees and, in the case of approvals to withdrawal where 
consent of the remaining Members is required, dissociating Members shall not 
be considered Members entitled to vote for the purpose of determining a 
Majority. In the case of a Member who has Disposed of that Member's entire 
Membership Interest to an Assignee, but has not been removed as provided 
below, the Sharing Ratio of such Assignee shall be considered in determining a 
Majority and such Member's vote or consent shall be determined by such 
Sharing Ratio. 
6.3 Liability of Members - No Member shall be liable as such for the 
liabilities of the Company. The failure of a limited liability company to observe 
any formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its powers or 
management of its business or affairs under this agreement or the Act shall not 
be grounds for imposing personal liability on the Members or Managers for 
liabilities of the limited liability company. 
6.4 Indemnification - The Company shall indemnify the Members, 
Managers, and agents for all costs, losses, liabilities, and damages paid or 
accrued by such Member, Managers or agent in connection with the business of 
the Company, to the fullest extent provided or allowed by the laws of the state 
of Utah. 
6.5 Representations and Warranties - Each member, and in the case of an 
organization, the person(s) executing the Operating Agreement on behalf of the 
organization, hereby represents and warrants to the Company and each other 
Member that: (a) if that Member is a organization, that it is duly organized, 
validly existing, and in good standing under the law of its state of organization 
and that it has full organizational power to execute and agree to the Operating 
Agreement to perform its obligations hereunder; (b) that the Member is 
acquiring its interest in the Company for the Member's own account as an 
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investment and without an intent to distribute the interest; (c) the Member 
acknowledges that the interests have not been registered under the Securities Act 
of 1933 or any state securities laws, and may not be resold or transferred by the 
Member without appropriate registration or the availability of an exemption 
from such requirements. 
6.6 Conflicts of Interests 
6.6.1 A Member, including a Manager, shall be entitled 
to enter into transactions that may be considered to be competitive 
with, or a business opportunity that may be beneficial to, the Company, 
it being expressly understood that some of the Members may enter into 
transactions into which the Company may enter. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, Members shall account to the Company and hold as trustee 
for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the Member, without 
th6 consent of the other Members, in the conduct and winding up of the 
Company business or from a use of appropriation by the Member of 
Company property including information developed exclusively for the 
Company and opportunities expressly offered to the Company. 
6.6.2 A Member, including a Manager does not violate a duty or 
obligation to the Company merely because the Member's conduct 
furthers the Member's own interest. A Member may lend money to and 
transact other business with the Company. The rights and obligations of 
a Member who lends money to or transacts business with the Company 
are the same as those of a person who is not a Member, subject to other 
applicable law. No transaction with the Company shall be voidable 
solely because a Member has a direct or indirect interest in the 
transaction if either the transaction is fair to the Company or the 
disinterested Managers or disinterested Members, in either case knowing 
the material facts of the transaction and the Member's interest, 
authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction. 
ARTICLE VII 
MANAGERS 
7.1 Original Managers - The ordinary and usual decisions concerning the 
business affairs of the Company shall be made by the Managers. The Managers 
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must be Members of the Company. The initial Managers shall be Scott F. 
McNeil and Dale K. Bennett, 
7.2 Term of Office as Managers - No Manager shall have any contractual 
right to such position. Each Manager shall serve until the earliest of (a) the 
Dissociation of such Manager, or (b) the removal of the Manager. 
7.3 Authority of Members to Bind the Company - The Members hereby 
agree that only the Managers and authorized agents of the Company shall have 
the authority to bind the Company. No Member other than a Manager shall 
take any action as a Member to bind the Company, and shall indemnify the 
Company for any costs or damages incurred by the Company as a result of the 
unauthorized action of such Member. The Managers have the power, on behalf 
of the Company, to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out the 
business and affairs of the Company, including, without limitation: 
(av) the institution, prosecution and defense of any Proceeding 
in the Company's name; 
(b) the purchase, receipt, lease or other acquisition, ownership, 
holding, improvement, use and other dealing with, Property, wherever 
located; 
(c) the sale, conveyance, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and 
other disposition of Property; 
(d) the entering into contracts and guaranties; incurring of 
liabilities; borrowing money, issuance of notes, bonds, and other 
obligations; and the securing of any of its obligations by mortgage or 
pledge of any of its Property or income; 
(e) the lending of money, investment and reinvestment of the 
Company's funds, and receipt and holding of Property as security for 
repayment, including, without limitation, the loaning of money to, and 
otherwise helping Members, officers, employees, and agents; 
(f) the conduct of the Company's business, the establishment of 
Company offices, and the exercise of the powers of the Company 
within or without Utah; 
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(g) the appointment of employees and agents of the Company, 
the defining of their duties and the establishment of their compensation; 
(h) the payment of pensions and establishment of pension plans, 
pension trusts, profit sharing plans, and benefit and incentive plans 
for all or any of the current or former Members, employees, and agents 
of the Company; 
(i) the making of donations to the public welfare or for 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes; 
(j) the payment or donation, or any other act that furthers the 
business and affairs of the Company; 
(k) the payment of compensation, or additional compensation to 
any or all Members, and employees on account of services previously 
rendered to the limited liability company, whether or not an agreement 
to pay such compensation was made before such services were 
rendered; 
(1) the purchase of insurance the life of any of its Members, or 
employees for the benefit of the Company; 
(m) the participation in partnership agreements, joint ventures, 
or other associations of any kind with any person or persons; and 
(n) the indemnification of Members or any other Person. 
7.4 Actions of the Managers - The Managers have the power to bind the 
Company as provided in this Article VII. No person dealing with the Company 
shall have any obligation to inquire into the power or authority of the Managers 
acting on behalf of the Company. Whenever a matter is required or allowed to 
be approved by the Managers under the Act or the Operating Agreement, such 
matter shall be considered approved or consented to upon the receipt of the 
affirmative approval or consent, of Managers having Sharing Ratios in excess of 
one half of the Sharing Ratios of all Managers. 
7.5 Compensation of Managers - The Managers shall be reimbursed for all 
reasonable expenses incurred in managing the Company and shall be entitled to 
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compensation, in an amount to be determined from time to time by the 
affirmative vote of a Majority of the Members. 
7.6 Managers' Standard of Care - The Managers' duty of care in the 
discharge of the Managers' duties to the Company and the other Members is 
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. In discharging their 
duties, the Managers shall be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the 
records required to be maintained under Article IV and upon such information, 
opinions, reports or statements by any of its other Members, or agents, or by 
any other person, as to matters the Managers reasonably believes are within 
such other person's professional or expert competence and who has been 
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the Company, including 
information, opinions, reports or statements as to the value and amount of the 
assets, liabilities, profits or losses of the Company or any other facts pertinent 
to the existence and amount of assets from which distributions to members 
might properly be paid. 
7.7 Removal of Managers - A Manager may be removed by the affirmative 
vote of a Majority of the Members. 
ARTICLE VHI 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS 
8.1 Initial Contributions - Each Initial Member has made the Capital 
Contributions described for that Member on Exhibit A. The value of the 
Capital Contributions shall be as set forth on Exhibit A. No interest shall 
accrue on any Capital Contribution and no Member shall have the right to 
withdraw or be repaid any Capital Contribution except as provided in this 
Operating Agreement. Each Additional Member shall make the Initial Capital 
Contribution described in the Admission Agreement. The value of the 
Additional Member's Initial Capital Contribution and the time for making such 
contribution shall be set forth in the Admission Agreement. 
8.2 Additional Contributions - In addition to the initial Capital 
Contributions, the Managers, with the approval of a Majority of the Members, 
may determine from time to time that additional contributions are needed to 
enable the Company to conduct its business. Upon making such a 
determination, the Managers shall give Notice to all Members in writing at least 
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thirty (30) business days prior to the date on which such contribution is due. 
Such Notice shall set forth the amount of additional contribution needed, the 
purpose for which the contribution is needed, and the date by which the 
Members should contribute. Any additional contributions not paid when due 
shall bear interest at the Default Interest Rate. The Company shall have the right 
to offset any delinquent contributions from distributions of Company earnings 
or profits of a Member. 
8.3 Maintenance of Capital Accounts - The Company shall establish and 
maintain Capital Accounts for each Member and Assignee. Each Member's 
Capital Account shall be increased by (a) the amount of any Money actually 
contributed by the Member to the capital of the Company, (b) the fair market 
value of any Property contributed, as determined by the Company and the 
contributing Member at arm's length at the time of contribution (net of 
liabilities assumed by the Company or subject to which the company takes such 
Property, within the meaning of §752 of the Code), and (c) the Member's share 
of Net Profits and of any separately allocated items of income or gain except 
adjustments of the Code (including any gain and income from unrealized income 
with respect to accounts receivable allocated to the Member to reflect the 
difference between the book value and tax basis of assets contributed by the 
Member). Each Member's Capital Account shall be decreased by (i) the 
amount of any Money distributed to the Member by the Company, (ii) the fair 
market value of any Property distributed to the Member (net of liabilities of die 
Company assumed by the Member or subject to which the Member takes such 
Property within the meaning of §752 of the Code), and (iii) the Member's share 
of Net Losses and of any separately allocated items of deduction or loss 
(including any loss or deduction allocated to the Member to reflect the 
difference between the book value and tax basis of assets contributed by the 
Member). 
8.4 Distribution of Assets - If the Company at any time distributes any of 
its assets in-kind to any Member, the Capital Account of each Member shall be 
adjusted to account for that Member's allocable share (as determined under 
Article IX below) of the Net Profits or Net Losses that would have been 
realized by the Company had it sold the assets that were distributed at their 
respective fair market values immediately prior to their distribution. 
8.5 Sale or Exchange of Interest - In the event of a sale or exchange of 
some or all of a Member's Interest in the Company, the Capital Account of the 
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Transferring Member shall become the capital account of the assignee, to the 
extent it relates to the portion of the Interest Transferred. 
8.6 Compliance with Section 704(b) of the Code - The provisions of this 
Article VIII as they relate to the maintenance of Capital Accounts are intended, 
and shall be construed, and, if necessary, modified to cause the allocations of 
profits, losses, income, gain and credit pursuant to Article IX to have 
substantial economic effect under the Regulations promulgated under §704(b) of 
the Code, in light of the distributions made pursuant to Articles IX and XIV and 
the Capital Contributions made pursuant to this Article VIII. Notwithstanding 
anything herein to the contrary, this Operating Agreement shall not be construed 
as creating a deficit restoration obligation or otherwise personally obligate any 
Member to make a Capital Contribution in excess of the Initial Capital 
Contribution. 
ARTICLE IX 
ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
9.1 Allocations of Net Profits and Net Losses from Operations - Except 
as may be required by §704(c) of the Code, and Section 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4, net 
profits, net losses, and other items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit 
shall be apportioned among the Members in proportion to their Sharing Ratios. 
9.2 Company Minimum Gain Chargeback - If there is a net decrease in 
Company Minimum Gain for a Taxable Year, each Member must be allocated 
items of income and gain for that Taxable Year equal to that Member's share of 
the net decrease in Company Minimum Gain. A Member's share of the net 
decrease in Company Minimum Gain is the amount of the total net decrease 
multiplied by the Member's percentage share of the Company Minimum Gain at 
the end of the immediately preceding Taxable Year. A Member's share of any 
decrease in Company Minimum Gain resulting from a revaluation of Company 
Property equals the increase in the Member's Capital Account attributable to the 
revaluation to the extent the reduction in minimum gain is caused by the 
revaluation. A Member is not subject to the Company Minimum Gain 
Chargeback Requirement to the extent the Member's share of the net decrease in 
Company Minimum Gain is caused by a guarantee, refinancing, or other change 
in the debt instrument causing it to become partially or wholly a Recourse 
Liability or a Member Nonrecourse Liability, and the Member bears the 
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economic risk of loss (within the meaning of §1.752-2 of the regulations) for 
the newly guaranteed, refinanced, or otherwise changed liability. 
9.3 Member Minimum Gain Chargeback - If during a Taxable Year there 
is a net decrease in member Minimum Gain, any Member with a share of that 
Member Minimum Gain (as determined under §L704~2(i)(5) of the 
Regulations) as of the beginning of that Taxable Year must be allocated items of 
income and gain for that Taxable Year (and, if necessary, for succeeding 
Taxable Years) equal to that Member's share of the net decrease in the 
Company Minimum Gain. A Member's share of the net decrease in Member 
Minimum Gain is determined in a manner consistent with the provisions of 
paragraph 9.2. A Member is not subject to this Member Minimum Gain 
Chargeback, however, to the extent the net decrease in member Minimum Gain 
arises because the liability ceases to be Member Nonrecourse Liability due to a 
conversion, refinancing, or other change in the debt instrument that causes it to 
become partially or wholly a Company Nonrecourse Liability. The amount that 
would otherwise be subject to the Member Minimum Gain Chargeback is added 
to the Member's share of Company Minimum Gain. In addition, rules 
consistent with those applicable to Company Minimum Gain shall be applied to 
determine the shares of Member Minimum Gain and Member Minimum Gain 
Chargeback to the extent provided under the Regulations issued pursuant to 
§704(b) of the Code. 
9.4 Qualified Income Offset - In the event any Member, in such capacity, 
unexpectedly receives an Offsettable Decrease, such Member will be allocated 
items of income and gain (consisting of a pro rata portion of each item of 
partnership income and gain for such year) in an amount and manner sufficient 
to offset such Offsettable Decrease as quickly as possible. 
9.5 Interim Distributions - From time to time, the Managers shall 
determine in their reasonable judgment to what extent, if any, die Company's 
cash on hand exceeds the current and anticipated needs, including, without 
limitation, needs for operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, reserves, 
and mandatory distributions, if any. To the extent such excess exists, the 
Managers may make distributions to the Members in accordance with their 
Sharing Ratios. Such distributions shall be in cash or Property (which need not 
be distributed proportionately) or partly in both, as determined by the 
Managers. 
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9.6 Limitations on Distributions - No distribution shall be declared and 
paid unless, after the distribution is made, the assets of the Company are in 
excess of all liabilities of the Company, except liabilities to Members on 
account of their Capital Accounts. 
ARTICLE X 
TAXES 
10.1 Elections - The Managers may make any tax elections for the Company 
allowed under the Code or the tax laws of any state or other jurisdiction having 
taxing jurisdiction over the Company. 
10.2 Taxes of Taxing Jurisdictions - To the extent that the laws of any 
Taxing Jurisdiction requires, each Member requested to do so by the Managers 
will submit an agreement indicating that the Member will make timely income 
tax payments to the Taxing Jurisdiction and that the Member accepts personal 
jurisdiction of the Taxing Jurisdiction with regard to the collection of income 
taxes attributable to the Member's income, and interest, and penalties assessed 
on such income. If the Member fails to provide such agreement, the Company 
may withhold and pay over to such Taxing Jurisdiction the amount of tax, 
penalty and interest determined under the laws of the Taxing Jurisdiction with 
respect to such income. Any such payments with respect to the income of a 
Member shall be treated as a distribution for purposes of Article IX. The 
Managers may, where permitted by the rules of any Taxing Jurisdiction, file a 
composite, combined or aggregate tax return reflecting the income of the 
Company and pay the tax, interest and penalties of some or all of the Members 
on such income to the Taxing Jurisdiction, in which case the Company shall 
inform the Members of the amount of such tax interest and penalties so paid. 
10.3 Tax Matters Partner - The Manager with the greatest Sharing Ratio 
shall serve as the tax matters partner of the Company pursuant to §6231(a)(7) of 
the Code. Any Member designated as tax matters partner shall take such action 
as many be necessary to cause each other Member to become a notice partner 
within the meaning of §6223 of die Code. 
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ARTICLE XI 
DISPOSITION OF MEMBERSHIP INTERESTS 
I L l First Right - No Member shall sell or transfer any Membership Interest, 
or any part thereof, nor enter into any agreement as a result of which any 
person or organization may become interested therein unless the transferring 
Member complies with the following conditions: 
11.1.1 The Membership Interest shall first be offered in writing to 
the Company at the price and on the terms of which it is proposed to 
be sold, and the Company shall have a period of thirty (30) days to 
accept or reject the offer in whole or in part, at the price (prorated, 
if the offer is accepted in part) and the terms proposed. 
11.1.2 If the offer is rejected in whole or in part by the Company, 
the Membership Interest, or remaining part thereof, shall next be 
offered in writing to the other Members for a period of twenty (20) 
days next following expiration of the thirty (30) day period. The offer 
to the other Members shall be prorated in accordance with the ratio of 
the interest of each Member to the total interest of all the Members 
other than the one making the offer, on the terms and at prices (as to 
each offeree) determined by prorating the price. If not all the 
remaining interest is disposed of under the apportionment, each 
Member desiring to purchase a portion of the remaining interest shall 
be entitled to purchase the portion that remains undisposed of as such 
Member's Interest in the Company bears to the interest of all other 
Members desiring to purchase portions of the remaining interest. 
11.1.3 If none or only a portion of the interest of the Member 
desiring to sell the same is purchased in accordance with Sections 
11.1.1 and 11.1.2, then the partner may sell his interest or the 
remainder to a third person or third persons during a three (3) month 
period following the expiration of the twenty (20) day period referred 
to in Section 11.1.2, but at a price not less than the price offered to the 
Company and Members (prorated if only a portion), and on terms no 
more favorable than such terms. After the expiration of such three (3) 
month period, the interest or portion of the remaining interest shall not 
be sold without first being offered to the Company and the remaining 
Members in accordance with this Article. 
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11.1.4 Any sale or transfer or purported sale or transfer of any 
Membership Interest shall be null and void unless made strictly in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article The transferee of any 
Member's interest shall be required to execute a counterpart of this 
Operating Agreement. 
lJ^PSl Nothing in this Article, however, shall prevent the 
Membership Interest of any Member from being transferred or disposed 
of by Will or intestacy for the benefit of the deceased Member's 
immediate family or transferred during a Member's lifetime, by sale, 
gift or inter vivos trust, to or for the benefit of the Member's immediate 
family, provided however, that in respect to transfers by way of 
testamentary or inter vivos trust, the trustee or trustees is or are to be a 
member or member of the Members' immediate family. 
1L2 Limitations - No Membership Interest shall be Disposed of: 
(a) if such disposition, alone or when combined with other 
transactions, would result in a termination of the Company within the 
meaning of §708 of the Code; 
(b) without an opinion of counsel satisfactory to the Managing 
Member that such assignment is subject to an effective registration 
under, or exempt from the registration requirements of, the applicable 
state and federal securities laws; and 
(c) unless and until the Company receives from the Assignee the 
information and agreements that the Managers may reasonably require, 
including but not limited to any taxpayer identification number and any 
agreement that may be required by any Taxing Jurisdiction. 
11.3 Compulsory Sale Upon Expulsion. Recognizing that a professional 
service company requires a harmonious and satisfactory personal relationship 
between the Members, the Members agree that the following grounds shall each 
constitute a sufficient reason for the holders of a 75 % majority interest in the 
Company to vote a mandatory purchase of a Member's Membership Interest in 
the Company. 
11.3.1 If any Member: 
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(a) Loses his license to practice engineering in Utah; 
(b) Engages in personal misconduct or a breach of this 
Agreement that makes his continued presence as a Member in 
the Company personally or professionally obnoxious or 
detrimental to the other Members of the Company; 
(c) Is convicted of a felony, or a crime involving a breach of 
ethics, moral turpitude, or immoral conduct; or 
(d) Becomes insolvent, makes an assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, or is declared a bankrupt. 
1i.3.2 No Member shall be expelled without at least 30 days prior 
written notice, which shall state the reason for expulsion and shall be signed by 
Members holding a 75 % majority interest in the Company. 
11.3.3 Upon the expulsion of a Member, the expelled Member shall 
be entitled to an amount equal to the book value of the Company multiplied by 
the expelled Member's percentage interest in the Company, less any amounts 
owing by the expelled Member to the Company. 
11.4 Dispositions not in Compliance with this Article Void. Any attempted 
Disposition of a Membership Interest, or any part thereof, not in compliance 
with this Operating Agreement is null and void ab initio. 
ARTICLE XH 
DISSOCIATION OF A MEMBER 
Dissociation - A Person shall cease to be a Member upon the happening 
of any of the following events: 
(a) the Withdrawal of a Member with the consent of a Majority 
of the remaining Members prior; 
(b) the bankruptcy of a Member; 
(c) the expulsion of a Member; 
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(d) in the case of a Member who is a natural person, the death 
of the Member or the entry of an order by a court of competent 
jurisdiction adjudicating the Member incompetent to manage the 
Member's personal estate; 
(e) in the case of a Member who is acting as a Member by 
virtue of being a trustee of a trust, the termination of the trust (but not 
merely the substitution of a new trustee); 
(0 in the case of a Member that is a separate Organization other 
than a corporation, the dissolution and commencement of winding up 
of the separate Organization; 
(g) in the case of a Member that is a corporation, the filing of a 
certificate of dissolution, or its equivalent, for the corporation or 
the revocation of its charter; or 
(h) in the case of an estate, the distribution by the fiduciary of 
the estate's entire interest in the limited liability company. 
£SQ Rights of Dissociating Member - In the event any Member dissociates 
prior to the expiration of the Term: 
(a) if the dissociation causes a dissolution and winding up of 
the Company under Article XIV, the Member shall be entitled to 
participate in the winding up of the Company to the same extent as 
any other Member except that any Distributions to which the Member 
would have been entitled shall be reduced by the damages sustained 
by the Company as a result of the Dissolution and winding up; 
(b) if the dissociation does not cause a dissolution and winding 
up of the Company under Article XIV, the Member shall be entitled to 
an amount equal to die book value of the Member's Membership Interest 
in the Company, to be paid within six months of the date of dissociation. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the dissociation is other than as 
a result of the death or incompetence of the Member, the Managing 
Members may pay the book value of the Member's Membership Interest 
in the Company out over a period not to exceed three years, provided 
that the dissociating Member shall be entitled to participate as an 
22 
ME 000058 
Assignee in the Company until the value of such interest (plus interest at 
the Default Interest Rate) is paid in full. 
ARTICLE XIII 
ADMISSION OF ASSIGNEES AND ADDITIONAL MEMBERS 
13.1 Rights of Assignees - The Assignee of a Membership Interest has no 
right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of the 
Company or to become a Member. The Assignee is only entitled to receive the 
Distributions and return of capital, and to be allocated the Net Profits and Net 
Losses attributable the Membership Interest. 
13.2 Admission of Substitute Members - An Assignee of a Membership 
Interest shall be admitted as a Substitute Member and admitted to all the rights 
of the Member who initially assigned the Membership Interest only with the 
approval of the Managers and a Majority of the Members. The Managers may 
grant or withhold the approval of such admission for any in their sole and 
absolute discretion. If so admitted, the Substitute Member has all the rights and 
powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of the Member 
originally assigning the Membership Interest. The admission of a Substitute 
Member, without more, shall not release the Member originally assigning the 
Membership Interest from any liability to Company that may existed prior to the 
approval. 
13.3 Admission of Permitted Transferees - Notwithstanding Section 13.2, 
hereof, the Membership Interest of any Member shall be transferable without 
the consent of the Managers or any of the Members if (i) the transfer occurs by 
reason of or incident to the death, dissolution, divorce, liquidation, merger or 
termination of the transferor Member, and (ii) the Transferee is a Permitted 
Transferee. 
13.4 Admission of Additional Members - The Managers may permit the 
admission of Additional Members and determine the Capital Contributions of 
such Members. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Additional Members may 
not become Members unless and until selected to such position as provided 
herein, and until they have executed an Admission Agreement in a form 
satisfactory to the Managers. 
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ARTICLE XIV 
DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP 
14.1 Dissolution - The Company shall be dissolved and its affairs wound up, 
upon the first to occur of the following events (which, unless the Members 
agree to continue the business, shall constitute Dissolution Events): 
(a) the expiration of the Term, unless the business of the 
Company is continued with the consent of a Majority of the Members; 
(b) die unanimous written consent of all of the Members; or 
(c) the Dissociation of the Managers, unless the business of the 
Company is conlinued with the consent of a Majority of the Members 
within 90 days after such Dissociation. 
14.2 Effect of Dissolution - Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease 
carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the Company business, but 
the Company is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of the affairs 
of the Company is completed. 
14.3 Distribution of Assets on Dissolution - Upon the winding up of the 
Company, the Company Property shall be distributed: 
(a) to creditors, including Members who are creditors, to the 
extent permitted by law, in satisfaction of Company Liabilities; 
(b) to Members in accordance with positive Capital Account 
balances taking into account all Capital Account adjustments for the 
Company's taxable year in which the liquidation occurs. Liquidation 
proceeds shall be paid within 60 days of the end of the Company's 
taxable year or, if later, within 90 days after the date of liquidation. 
Such distributions shall be in cash or Property (which need not be 
distributed proportionately) or partly in both, as determined by the 
Managers. 
14.4 Winding Up and Certificate of Dissolution - The winding up of a 
limited liability company shall be completed when all debts, liabilities, and 
obligations of the limited liability company have been paid and discharged or 
reasonably adequate provision therefor has been made, and all of the remaining 
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property and assets of the limited liability company have been distributed to the 
members. Upon the completion of winding up of the Company, a certificate of 
dissolution shall be delivered to the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code for filing. The certificate of dissolution shall set forth the information 
required by the Act. 
ARTICLE XV 
AMENDMENT 
15.1 Operating Agreement May Be Modified - The Operating Agreement 
may be modified as provided in this Article XV (as the same may, from time to 
time be amended). No Member or Manager shall have any vested rights in the 
Operating Agreement. 
15.2 Amendment or Modification of Operating Agreement - The 
Operating Agreement may be amended or modified from time to time only by a 
written instrument adopted by the Managers and executed by a Majority of the 
Members. 
ARTICLE XVI 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
16.1 Entire Agreement - The Operating Agreement together with the Articles 
of Organization represents the entire agreement among all the Members and 
between the Members and the Company. 
16.2 No Partnership intended for Nontax Purposes - The Members have 
formed the Company under the Act, and expressly do not intend hereby to form 
a partnership under either the Utah Uniform Partnership Act nor the Utah 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The Members do not intend to be partners 
one to another, or panners as to any third party. To the extent any Member, by 
word or action, represents to another person that any other Member is a partner 
or that the Company is a partnership, the Member making such wrongful 
representation shall be liable to any other Member who incurs personal liability 
by reason of such wrongful representation. 
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16.3 Rights of Creditors and Third Parties under Operating Agreement -
The Operating Agreement is entered into among the Company and the Members 
for the exclusive benefit of the Company, its Members, and their successors and 
assignees. The Operating Agreement is expressly not intended for the benefit of 
any creditor of the Company or any other Person. Except and only to the extent 
provided by applicable statute, no such creditor or third party shall have any 
rights under the Operating Agreement or any agreement between the Company 
and any Member with respect to any Capital Contribution or otherwise. 
16.4 Counterparts - This Operating Agreement may be executed in any 
number of counterparts, each of which when executed and delivered shall be 
deemed to be an original, and all of which together shall constitute one and the 
same instrument. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have executed this Operating Agreement as of the date 
set forth beside our names. 
Date / Z - ^ ^ k 
Scott F. McNeil 
Date i>Z.~'$C>-<\(* 
Dale K. Bennett 
&l**dt 
Date ifZ.-'SO-IC 
D. Bradford Peterson 
Date /J>-3J'?<> 
Date / •£--30-^(0 
9^y^0^-
ME 
EXHIBIT "A" 
MEMBER 
Scott F. McNeil 
Dale K. Bennett 
D. Bradford Peterson 
Kenneth A. Petty 
Stephen J. Fackrell 
D. Gregg Meyers 
Michael D. Hoffman 
Total 
INITIAL CAPITAL 
CONTRIBUTION 
$600.00 
250.00 
50.00 
40.00 
30.00 
15.00 
15.00 
$1,000.00 
PERCENTAGE 
INTEREST 
60.0% 
25.0% 
•5.0% 
4.0% 
3.0% 
1.5% 
1.5% 
100.0% 
ADDENDUM 2 
AMENDMENT NO, 2 
TO 
OPERATING AGREEMENT 
OF 
McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC 
THIS AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered 
into as of f^JjoxJ ^ > 2001, by and between the parties who have signed this Amendment 
No. 2 (this "Amendment"). 
R E C I T A L S 
A. Scott F. McNeil, Dale K. Bennett, D. Bradford Petersen, Kenneth A. Petty, D. 
Gregg Meyers and Michael D. Hoffman entered into an Operating Agreement with an 
effective date of January I, 1997, and amended August 1, 2000, by that certain Amendment 
No. 1 to Operating Agreement (the "Operating Agreement"), for McNEIL ENGINEERING 
AND LAND SURVEYING, LC (the "Company"). 
B. The parties hereto desire to amend the Operating Agreement to reflect the 
transfer of certain interests in the Company, and various other changes in the Operating 
Agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby amend the Operating Agreement as 
follows: 
1. The Members of the Company and their percentage interests as of the date of this 
Amendment are as follows: 
MEMBER 
Scott F. McNeil 
Dale K. Bennett 
D. Bradford Petersen 
Kenneth A. Petty 
Michael D. Hoffman 
ADDRESS 
6895 South 900 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
6895 South 900 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
6895 South 900 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
6895 South 900 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
6895 South 900 East 
PERCENTAGE 
INTEREST 
57.41% 
26.30% 
6.68% 
5.64% 
2.61% 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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D. Gregg Meyers 6895 South 900 East 1.57 % 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
2. Article I is hereby amended by deleting Sections 1.21 and 1.38. 
3. Article XI is hereby amended by deleting Section 11.1.5 in its entirety. 
4. Article XI is further amended by the addition of the following section: 
1L3.4 The term "book value" as used in this Article XI and in 
the following Article XII, shall mean the book value as determined by the Company's 
accountant who customarily prepares the Company's financial statements, with the 
standard adjustments and accruals as are normally reflected in the monthly financial 
statements, including but not limited to, the accrual of obligations of the Company to 
McNeil Engineering, Inc. 
5. Section 12.1 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
12.1 Dissociation - A Person shall cease to be a Member upon the happening 
of any of the following events: 
(a) the withdrawal of a Member; 
(b) the bankruptcy of a Member; 
(c) the expulsion of a Member; 
(d) the death of the Member; or 
(e) the disability of the Member, which shall be deemed to be a 
physical or mental condition of the Member which, in the opinion of a licensed 
physician selected by the remaining Members, renders the affected Member unable to 
perform the material duties and functions of his or her job with the Company. 
6. Section 12.2 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
12.2 Rights of Dissociating Member - In the event any Member dissociates 
prior to the expiration of the Term: 
(a) If the dissociation is as a result of the death of a Member, the 
Company shall redeem the Member's Membership Interest in an amount equal to the 
agreed upon value of the Member's Membership Interest in Company, as determined 
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annually by-the Company's regular accountant who customarily prepares th 
Company#s financial statements. The proceeds of any life insurance payable i, ..*•. 
Company as a result of the death of a Member shall not be taken into account u: 
determining the agreed upon value,, The purchase price to be paid under this Section 
12.2(a) shall be paid within 120 days of the date of death of the deceased Member, 
provided that the Company shall promptly and diligently proceed to collect the 
proceeds of any insurance policy held by the company upon the deceased Member's 
life, and shall immediately pay such proceeds (or such portion thereof as equals the 
., purchase price for the shares being purchased) to the deceased Member's estate. 
(b) In the event a Member dissociates prior to the expiration of the 
Term for any event other than the Member's death < >r wiihdrawa,!, the Member shall be 
entitled to an amount equal to the book value of the Member's Membership Interest in 
the Company (as defined in Section 11.3 4 above), to be paid over a period, not to 
exceed five years. 
i Ait.i h Ml i,i beieby luither amended by the addition of the following Section 1.2.3 
11,3 Option to Purchase in event of Withdrawal In the event a Member 
withdraws from the Company prior to the expiration of the Term, the Company and 
each other Member shall have an option to purchase the withdrawing Member's 
Membership Interest. The Company shall have the first option to purchase all, none, oi a 
portion of the withdrawing Member's Membership Interest, provided that the Company 
may purchase less than all of such interest only if the other Members agree to purchase the 
remainder of the interest. The non-withdrawing Members shall have the right to purchase 
any interest not purchased by the Company in the ratio that their ownership percentage 
bears to the ownership percentages of all Members electing to purchase the remaining 
interest. The terms and conditions of the option shall be as set forth below in this 
Section. 
(a) For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be deemed to 
withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's 
employment with the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, death, disability u 
incompetency. 
(5) Tjle option to purchase a withdrawing Member's Membership 
Interest shall be exercised by giving written notice thereof to the withdrawing Member 
(L. The purchase price shall be an amount equaj to \he boo* i-ue of 
the Member's Membership Interest in the Company (as d*-fin •.••' i ''<> M*»I • 
above), to be paid over a period not to exceed five years. 
(d) The closing of such purchase and sale shall lake place at the 
principal office of t k Company at a date designated by the Company., which date shall. 
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not be later than 90 days after the date upon which the option herein referred to is 
exercised. 
8. Section 13.3 is hereby deleted in its entirety. 
9. Section 14.1 is hereby amended by the deletion of paragraph (c). 
The Operating Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and shall remain 
unaltered, except to the extent specifically amended herein. 
The parties hereto acknowledge and consent to the transfer of certain membership 
interests. The parties hereto do hereby waive (a) any rights of first refusal, options or other 
rights they may have with respect to the interests being transferred, and (b) any notice to 
which they may otherwise be entitled with respect to said transfers. 
This Amendment may be signed in several counterparts, through the use of multiple 
signature pages appended to each original, and all such counterparts shall constitute one and 
the same instrument. Any counterpart to which is attached the signatures of all parties shall 
constitute an original of this Amendment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the 
date first above written. 
Scott F. McNeil x v A 
Dale K. Bennett 
D. Bradford Petersen 
Kenneth A. Petty N y 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Dak K Bennett 
13687 S.Haekamore Circle 
Draper. Uluh 8 U)20 
A U ; M I . : • -fJOS 
McNeil Engineerim;, Iiic. 
6895 S. 000 T 
Mi : - ' ! - ! :Mh S4047 
1(1' f iMioi' of Resignation - McNeil Engineering, Inc. 
i'luuik )Oi- j iwviding mc with the * -ppoim'-iH a- AI.-IK >A ,m
 v(,«[ f. ; . • liidiiy 
years. Because of the circumstances thai 1 ::\c *• un<-d ^-.v- the last lew v rck% ': 
believe that it is in my best interest to leave the company and pursue other option- ! 
therefore resign as an employee of McNeil Engineering, Inc. My intentions of 
pint hasing your shares along with the 5 other employees were all in good faith. 1 
w v/\7Q for any misunderstandings about the purchasing of (he compai:\ ; .-ever 
i<:d U to be a hostile takeover as you mentioned. I believe I have been honest 
•i >umg the best interests of McNeil Engineering during the course of my career. 
1 disagree with yo\n belittling comment that led me to believe that I don't have anv 
other options and that 1 must stay bete \-itr the company regardless. In a u^vni 
meeting we had with the other members, it was implied that I am not puliuu m\ 
weight and making the company enough money. I disagree with this comment and 
believe \ \w\\^ been a key role in the success of McNeil Engineering and Land 
Surveying, I X ever since it has been organized.. I have put in an enornioiis amount 
of time and energy above and beyond my call of duty and away from my family in 
helping the success of McNeil Engineering. I feel that I need to change my 
priorities and put my family in front of my career. Please consider this my two 
weeks notice. I will plan on working 40 hours per week for the next two weeks, If 
you would like my services longer than two weeks, I would be willing to work out 
consulting arrangements. 
As for h i p a,c I m not interested ir. .c-ii;.:: anv »•! m; mk-iehts m -. 
» = MI\ i have too much time and effort invested in it and establishing lib: lorn. 
i;i; -..iuj' with the employees. If you would like to sell vour portion pb-a •-Ic me 
kiu.v , otherwise. ! pli'i <m leaving it set up w if -M \v\\ 
: nor r r ly agreemeu- - n . - . - .-.. < 'irwash 
. -«ive alsi- ru«.losc<; *•*•: dii.s letie;. die buoks loi iingi ad. a disbutscme it 
check tor $4T500 and a check fui $36,000 to covci the vehicle I ih* -tight I had i 
sold before I left for Manila for $35,000. d he potential buyei wanh-d t•, KM"- , e \\.\ 
amount to $32,000 and so I went ahead and purchased it myself for $33odK< y,... 
mentioned to me in an e-mail tllat I would lose $10,000 the first year. 1 mentioned to 
yeni that the Mitsubishi Diamante cost me over $4,500 per venr h-, »:M I .n- * -^u ; 
October 20, 2005 
Page 2 
for around $7400 (private party value) and that I could sell my 2004 BMW and lose 
less than $4t500 the first year. Well I guess I was wrong but close. I used $3,000 of 
the $7,400 for the deposit on the car and another approx. $2,600 for taxes and 
licensing. The tint was approx. $190, spoiler approx. $475, and the chrome wheels 
approx. $2,600 ([ paid this and never expected the company to pay for this). The 
company paid approx. $35k plus $7.4k (less $2,500 I am giving you back) or $39.9k 
total. I am giving you $36k ($33.5k plus $2.5k for ($7.4k-$3k-$2.6k = $1.8k but I 
added an additional $700 in good faith). 
Please remember the following: 
1. I haven't taken a raise in over 6 years. 
2. I saved the company at least $24,000 over the past 4 years not taking 
out medical insurance. 
3. I have put in an incredible amount of additional hours away from my 
family in building the reputation and profitability of McNeil 
Engineering and Land Surveying, L.C. 
I have contributed to your ability to make in excess of $500,000 per year in 
personal income over a number of years. Due to the fact that I have contributed so 
much in building up the company over the years, I feel it fair that I receive at least 
current book value for my 252 interests (at least $695/interest) in a timely manner. 
I believe it is in both of our best interests to be as professional as possible 
during this transition for the sake of our families and current employees of McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. Should you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to 
contact my attorney, Reed Martineau at 322-9222 who is very familiar with the 
situation at hand. 
Respectfully yours, 
Dale K. Bennett 
ADDENDUM I 
REED L. MARTINEAU (210 6) 
KEITH A. CALL (670 8) 
DEREK J. WILLIAMS (98 64) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh F] oor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (8 01) 52 1-9000 
Telecopier: (801) 363-0400 
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" *RD J I JDICIAI D I S T R I C T COURT 
SAI/1 LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC., 
MCNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND 
SURVEYING, L.L.C., ENGCAD, 
L.L.C., and SCOTT McNEIL, 
E '1 a:i i ltd f f s , 
vs . 
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND LAND 
SURVEYING, L.L.C., BENCHMARK 
CAD SERVICES, L.L.C., LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC., 
DALE K. BENNETT, AND FLORENCE 
ALHAMBRA, i nd ivi dua11y, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR 
PARTIAI SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050917315 
.,] i i d g e A n i I B o y d e n 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendant 5-' Cronn-Motion tor Pa i I- id I Suinni.n y Jinlqui^nt cann-' before 
the Coui t for hearing on Friday, November : 1 7, 2 006. Plai ntiffs 
were represented by their counsel of record, Mai .t .1 lew C Barneck 
and Martha Knudson of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, and 
Defendants were represented by their counsel of record, Reed L. 
Martineau and Derek J. Williams of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings associated with 
each of these motions, and having heard argument from both 
counsel, for good cause showing, denies Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and grants Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. This order is based on the reasons 
stated by the Court at the hearing, including the following: 
1. Section 12.3 of the McNeil Engineering and Land 
Surveying ("ME&LS") Operating Agreement ("Operating Agreement") 
provides that a member "shall be deemed to withdraw when the 
Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's employment 
with the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, death, 
disability or incompetency." 
2. Section 1.10 of the Operating Agreement defines 
"Company" as McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying." On August 
17, 2005, Defendant Dale Bennett voluntarily resigned his 
employment with McNeil Engineering, Inc. ("MEI"). The Court 
concludes that the term "employment" as it is used in Section 
12.3 of the. Operating Agreement is not ambiguous, and that the 
natural use and meaning of that term as it is used within Section 
2 
12,3 is that in order to withdraw as a member, the member must 
voluntary 1 y r ^ inr * !<u i - -^> - >•* ^ • - m Mh&LS . 
3 . n: * .,..', . . ., IM.ICS ^hat the parties intended the 
term "employment" t<; refer only to employment specifical] y with 
ME&.1 iS . . . \ *- n; - :i : • i'.-: rerm to be broad 
enough r< uc!udo employees leased from other businesses Five 
years aftr] '"inn .. ' -\ < < -,;. • ng Agi eemei it, 1:1 ie par t::i es 
made significant atLionuuienLs to Section 1 2,3 of the Operating 
Agreement ,uid did ?-if make mv ^hames to tl ie defi n:i tioi is or 
c;,Ir . •-u: :;_;.!• j>.- wn i-. .. ;;JUJ a manifest an intention to broaden the 
scope of Section 12.3 lu include anything other than traditional 
emp] oyees 
1. Because Dale Bennett did not; voluntarily resign 
emph --per1 with ME&LS, tl ie Coi irt declares tt lat 1 ie i s curi ei itly, 
a^zx .jj.iicc it~s inception, has been a member of ME&LS. As a 
resit1'tf Dale BenneM is entitled t:o all of the rights, of a 
''tje , , r^ examp.i e the same right to current 
information, accounting, disbursement ;:. u:d other benefits that 
any other member of ME&I iS i s entit]- eeeive. 
5. •i^ e^.j on the foregoing, the P] ai ntiffs are ordered to 
submit i o 'io,.msel for m i B( rrn let!: ai u I 1 1 .1 ic Cc ;>i n t , w : -. • 0 
days of November 1 7, 2 006, a full and complete accounting of all 
3 
of the rights, disbursements, and other benefits given to members 
of ME&LS since August 17, 2005, including an accounting of all 
rights, disbursements, and other benefits that have or have not 
been given to Dale Bennett. The Plaintiffs are also ordered to 
immediately produce to Mr. Bennett all of the documents 
supporting and related to the accounting or which form the basis 
for making the accounting. 
DATED this ^l^h day of December, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorab 
Distr 
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ERTIPU/AT;I vt SERVICE 
I state that J am employed in the law offices of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendants herein; that I 
served the attached ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS' Cl^S/ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
Case No. 050917315, Third Judicial District Court, S,i 11 Lake 
County, State of Utah, upon the following parties by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope to: 
Mi Matthew C. Barneck 
Ms. Martha Knudson 
Mr. Paul Burghardt 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
5 0 South Main Street, 7th F] oor 
Post Office Box 24 65 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
At torneys for PI a i ntif f s 
and causing tl le same to be 
D mailed first clasps, postage pre-paid, 
jS hand delivered, 
• ' % • 
on ttie f __ day of December, 2 00 6. 
N:\22658\l\Pleadings\Order on MPSJ Countercla 
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ADDENDUM 5 
REED L. MARTINEAU (210 6) . 
KEITH A. CALL (6708) 
DEREK J. WILLIAMS (98 64) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh rloor 
Post Office Box 4 5000 
Salt Lake City, Utah o'J., 
Telephone: (801) 5/1-9000 
Telecopier: (HC1) it '-04 00 
FILED BISTB5CT eOOBT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 0 3 2008 
SALT UWEZOmiY 
By 
eputy Clerk 
•n 1 H T H . ^ D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT 
! NTY, JITATK < >K NT- \ll 
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC., McNEIL 
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, 
L,L.C., ENGCAD,LLC, and 
SCOTT McNEII • , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND LAND 
SURVEYING, L.L.C., BENCHMARK CAD 
SERVICES, L.L.C., LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CADD, INC., DALE K. BENNETT and 
FLORENCE ELHAMBRA, Individual1y, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND .JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050917315 
Judge Pat Brian 
ENTERED IN RtGIS'i 
OF JUDGMENT'S 
DATE 0*\Q°\ - -
This m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e Court on Defendant Dale B e n n e t t / s 
Motion for" Order of .Judgment. The rno t "> o n was f uJ 1 y b r i e f ed ai Id 
r\ime be fo re Lho i.'n : o r a l argun—nt on March 18, 2008. 
P l a i n t i f f s were r e p r e s e n t e d by Matthew C. Barneck . A l l Defendants 
o t h e r than Fl o rence E1 hambra were r e p r e s e i i ted by Reed I ,. Ma r t i i le .. E .1 I, 
Order and Judgment @J 
Kci t 11 < i l l Mi' I I >" i c k J . Wi ] 1 1 arris . 
By his motion, Defendant Dale Bennett asked the Court to enter 
a judgment certain against Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant McNeil 
Engineering & Land Surveying, LLC ("ME&LS") in the amount of 
$142,174.93, which Bennett claims represents his share of cash 
distributions for the years 2005 and 2007. 
Bennett's motion is hereby GRANTED. The Court finds that 
there is no just reason for delaying entry of judgment as requested 
by Bennett. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Dale K. Bennett 
against McNeil Engineering & Land Surveying, LLC in the amount of 
$142,174.93. This judgment shall bear post-judgment interest at 
the rate of 5.42% per year from the date this judgment is entered. 
ME&LS is ordered to deliver a certified check payable to Dale 
Bennett in the amount of $142,174.93 to the offices of Benchmark 
Engineering and Land Surveying by no later than 5:00 p.m. on 
April 1, 2008. 
DATED this *Q day of JLJj /J ft/^ 2008, 
Honorable Pat Bti.an 
District Cobrt Judge .,., .: w. 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 state that I am. employed ~; law offices of Si IOW, 
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys ;< J defendants herein; that I 
served the attached ORDER AND JUDGMENT, Case No. 050917315, Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, upon the 
following parties by placi ng a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope to: 
Mr. Matthew C. Barneck 
Mr. Paul Burghardt 
Richards, Brandt, Mill er & Nelson 
Wells Fargo Building 
299 South Main Street, Si ] i t ,c ; ] 5(30 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and causing the same to be 
mailed first class, postage pre-paid, 
hand delivered, 
on the c>^^day of March, 2008. 
ADDENDUM 6 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OQOQO 
McNeil Engineering and Land 
Surveying, LLC; McNeil 
Engineering, Inc.; and Scott 
McNeil, 
Plaintiff, Counterclaim 
Defendant, and Appellant, 
v. 
Dale K. Bennett; Benchmark 
Engineering and Land 
Surveying, LLC; et al., 
Defendant, Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080319-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 21, 2009) 
2009 UT App 138 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050917315 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: Matthew C. Barneck and Paul P. Burghardt, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Reed L. Martineau, Keith A. Call, and Derek J. 
Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Davis. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Appellant McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC (ME&LS) 
filed suit against Appellee Dale K. Bennett for various claims, 
and Bennett asserted several counterclaims. The parties 
eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue 
of whether Bennett's employment resignation from McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. triggered his withdrawal as a member of ME&LS. 
The district court determined that Bennett did not withdraw as a 
member of ME&LS and was therefore due his share of disbursements. 
ME&LS filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district 
court denied. The district court then, on Bennett's motion, 
determined there was "no just reason for delaying entry of 
judgment as requested by Bennett" for his share of cash 
distributions. ME&LS now appeals. 
The threshold issue before us is whether we have subject 
matter jurisdiction to address the other issues that the parties 
raise on appeal, that is, we must first determine whether the 
order being appealed from was properly certified for appeal under 
rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the 
parties assert that this case is properly before us via a rule 
54(b) certification, this consensus is not dispositive. 
"'Acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction and . . . a lack of jurisdiction can be raised at 
any time by either party or by the court.'" Kennecott Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991) (omission 
in original) (quoting Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986)). 
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court has further 
elaborated on the requirements of certification under rule 54(b): 
First, there must be multiple claims for 
relief or multiple parties to the action. 
Second, the judgment appealed from must have 
been entered on an order that would be 
appealable but for the fact that other claims 
or parties remain in the action. Third, the 
trial court, in its discretion, must make a 
determination that there is no just reason 
for delay of the appeal. 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
proper certification under rule 54(b) does not occur when the 
district court simply directs that judgment be entered and makes 
the order final. See id. at 768. The district court must 
additionally determine "whether there was any just reason for 
delaying the appeal. Ef it found none, it would then be free to 
enter such a certification, permitting the appeal to proceed." 
Id. Neither of these two determinations alone is sufficient for 
certification under rule 54(b): 
20080319-CA 2 
We must emphasize that all of these 
requirements must be met. An order that is 
"final" as to a claim or a party in a multi-
claim or multi-party suit is appealable under 
Rule 54(b) only if it is accompanied by a 
district court certification that no just 
reason exists for delaying the appeal; an 
order that does not wholly dispose of a claim 
or a party is not "final" under Rule 54(b) 
and will not be appealable, even with such a 
certification. 
Id. (emphasis added),1 
The parties argue that the district court properly certified 
this case under rule 54(b) because the court's Order and Judgment 
stated, "The Court finds that there is no just reason for 
delaying entry of judgment as requested by Bennett." Although 
this reflects the district court's determination that the Order 
was a final order, it is unclear whether the court meant the 
Order was a final order for purposes of 54(b) .2 Moreover, the 
district courts have been directed to provide findings 
supporting both the determination that a judgment is final under 
rule 54(b) and the determination that there is no just reason for 
delay of the appeal. See Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 
139 (Utah 1992) ("In order to facilitate this court's review of 
judgments certified as final under rule 54(b), trial courts 
should henceforth enter findings supporting the conclusion that 
such orders are final."); id. ("[T]his court has yet to see a 
single instance where a trial court has advanced a rationale as 
to why there was no just reason for delay. Because this 
determination by the trial court is subject to judicial review 
under an abuse of discretion standard, a brief explanation should 
accompany all future certifications so that this court may render 
an informed decision on that question."). 
2Under the facts of this case, that determination would be 
inappropriate in any event. The approach adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court "requires that before a claim can be considered 
separate, the facts underlying it must be different than those 
underlying other claims in the action." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991) . Thus, to 
determine whether an issue certified for appeal is separate from 
the issues remaining in district court, we "focus [] on the degree 
of factual overlap between [the issues]. When this factual 
overlap is such that separate claims appear to be based on the 
same operative facts or on the same operative facts with minor 
variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for 
(continued...) 
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Order lacks an accompanying determination that there is no just 
reason for delay in bringing an appeal. This conclusion is 
underscored by the following exchange at the hearing on Bennett's 
motion to enforce the prior summary judgment ruling: 
[ME&LS's counsel]: And I presume that 
order is going to make the--state the 
language under Rule 54(b) that it's--therefs 
an express determination of final judgment. 
I think that's what they were asking for. 
[Bennett's counsel]: Your Honor, we 
simply requested a judgment. We didn't 
request that it be certifiable so it could be 
appealed on an interlocutory basis. 
THE COURT: The Court simply granted the 
relief prayed for in the motion, and orders 
counsel for [Bennett] to so reflect in the 
order. 
All right, next matter. 
[ME&LS's counsel]: I'm sorry, Your 
Honor. I have to ask for some clarification, 
because I'm at a loss here. [Their] moving 
papers did ask for a final judgment, and the 
Court is entering a ruling that is, in fact, 
a final judgment. You['re] ordering my 
client to make payment by a date certain. 
THE COURT: Is counsel not correct? 
That was the specific relief that defense 
counsel sought, and the specific relief the 
Court granted. 
[Bennett's counsel]: We sought a 
judgment--an order of judgment in that 
amount, Your Honor. We did not specifically 
request that it be certified as [a] final 
order for--as a final judgment for purposes 
of appeal. So I don't know what--exactly 
2(...continued) 
rule 54(b) purposes." Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Here, where the majority, if not all, of the 
issues in this case are related to Bennett's resignation and the 
events surrounding it, and where there remains pending an ME&LS 
claim that Bennett breached the operating agreement, there is 
factual overlap between the claim before us and claims pending in 
the district court. 
20080319-CA 4 
what we1re asking for here. We wanted a 
judgment that we could collect upon. Your 
Honor, has ruled that the payment is to be 
made, and--
THE COURT: Cite the specific language 
in your motion regarding the relief sought, 
and that is the order of the Court--whatever 
the specific language of your motion reads. 
The district court therefore clearly made no determination as to 
whether there was any just reason for delaying an appeal but 
simply granted Bennett's motion, which requested only "an order 
of judgment for Bennett's share of member distributions."3 Thus, 
there was no proper certification under rule 54(b), and we do not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in 
this appeal. 
"When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it 
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, 
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We 
therefore dismiss the appeal. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
3Bennett's motion was devoid of the "no just reason for 
delay" language but instead stated, "There is no reason the Court 
cannot enter a judgment against ME&LS for this amount and order 
that Plaintiffs pay Bennett this amount." Bennett's supporting 
memorandum used language closer to that of rule 54(b), stating, 
"Bennett is entitled to this judgment based upon the Court's 
prior ruling and there is no just cause for delaying the entry of 
this judgment." Neither filing, however, requested the court to 
make a determination that there was no just reason for delaying 
an appeal. 
20080319-CA 5 
ADDENDUM 7 
RECEIVED 
SEP 2 3 2010 
Richards, Brandt 
Miller & Nelson SEP 21 ^
ow 
MTrAK\ECUON^ 
Deputy < 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC., McNEIL ' 
ENGINEERING AND LAND 
SURVEYING, LLC, and, SCOTT 
McNEIL, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND 
LAND SURVEYING, LLC, BENCHMARK 
CAD SERVICES, LAND 
DEVEOLOPMENT CADD, INC., DALE K. 
BENNETT, an individual, and, 
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an 
individual, 
Defendants.. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 050917315 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants' Notice to Submit for 
Decision their Motion to Enforce Judgment and Motion for Leave to (1) Serve Third Set 
of Interrogatories, (2) File Fourth Request for Production of Documents, and (3) Take 
Second 30(b)(6) Deposition, filed July 21, 2010. The Court having reviewed 
Defendants' Motions and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto, and being duly advised in the 
premises of each, makes the following ruling. 
Defendants' Motion to Enforce Judgment 
Defendants request the Court to enforce the April 3, 2008, Order and Judgment 
issued by the Honorable Pat Brian. The Order and Judgment entered in favor of 
Defendant Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") in the amount of $142,174.93. On April 21, 
2008, the parties stipulated a joint motion to stay the pending trial while Plaintiffs 
appealed in part, the Court's Order entered December 21, 2006, which ruled that 
Bennett is a member of ME&LS and an Order entered April 2, 2008, which denied 
reconsideration of the December 21, 2006, ruling. 
Pursuant to the terms of the April 21, 2008, stipulation Bennett agreed that the 
stay of any execution of the Order and Judgment may be entered without the need to 
post a supersedeas bond. On May 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiffs' 
appeal for failure to show certification of the finality of the trial court's order. A remittitur 
was entered on August 10, 2009. 
Defendants now seek enforcement of the April 3, 2008, Order and Judgment as 
the basis for the earlier stipulation no longer apply. 
This Court finds the following explanation regarding such matters helpful in its 
consideration: 
[TJhe "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to 
prevent injustice. "The purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of 
economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the 
delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings 
upon the same propositions in the same case." Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). See Conderv. A. L. 
Williams &Assocs.. Inc.. 739 P,2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
"Although a trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, prior 
relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be followed." 
People ex. rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983). 
2 
The law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the 
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the case 
in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced. 
Sittner v. Bio Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc.. 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. Gibbons 
& Reed Co., 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973). 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Upon review of the case, the Order and Judgment issued on April 3, 2008, was 
intended to serve as the final order on Defendants' counterclaim for declaratory relief. 
See e.g. Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245,1J12, 988 P.2d 1 ("In this case, the 
October 21 Order was properly certified because it granted summary judgment for all 
claims against the Estate. Further, the trial court also made the required finding that 
there was 'no just reason for delay/ and expressly ordered the entry of judgment as 
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).") 
Similarly, Judge Brian's Court found "that there is no just reason for delaying 
entry of judgment as requested by Bennett." The Order and Judgment was entered into 
the Registry of Judgments on April 9, 2008. 
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order and 
Judgment, issued and entered on April 3, 2008, is a final order on Defendants' 
counterclaim for declaratory relief. 
Defendants7 Motion for Leave 
Defendants' seek leave from this Court to continue certain discovery proceedings 
because of Plaintiffs' alleged actions which are contrary to the ruling of the Honorable 
3 
Ann Boyden. Specifically, while Judge Boyden declared in a ruling issued November 
17, 2006, that Bennett was entitled to all of the rights of other ME&LS members, 
Plaintiffs have allegedly been acting contrary to this ruling by failing to provide Bennett 
with information he is claimed to be entitled to including: tax returns, financial 
statements, disbursements of any kind to other members, etc. 
Defendants fail to present any viable legal argument and analysis to the Court 
that would address their claimed entitlement to additional discovery in light of a final 
ruling on Bennett's claim for declaratory relief and dismissal of his accounting claim on 
January 29, 2008. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants1 Motion for Leave. 
This Ruling serves as the Order of the Court. No further order is required. 
Dated 21s1 day of September, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated 
this '1V^ day of September,2010, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau 
Keith A. Call 
Derek J. Williams 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Matthew C. Barneck 
Martha Knudson 
Paul P. Burghardt 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
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MATTHEW C. BARNECK [5249] 
PAUL P. BURGHARDT [10795] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
E-Mail: Matthew-Barneck(5),rbmn.com 
Paul-Burghardt@rbmn.com 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC; McNEIL 
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, I AMENDED ORDER CERTIFYING 
LLC; and SCOTT McNEIL, an individual, ORDER AND JUDGMENT AS FINAL 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND 
LAND SURVEYING, LLC; BENCHMARK 
CAD SERVICES, LLC; LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC; and Civil No. 050917315 
DALE K. BENNETT, an individual; 
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an individual, Judge L.A. Dever 
Defendants and Counter Claimants. 
OCT 
**~ 
*Ke 
GST 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion to Alter or Amend Order 
filed by Plaintiff McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC ("MEALS") on October 1,2010, 
and also the Motion for Certification That The April 3, 2008 Order and Judgment is Final for 
Purposes of Rule 54(b) and for Appeal, recently filed by the Defendants. Based on the foregoing, the 
Court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows: 
1. An Order and Judgment was entered in this case by the Honorable Pat Brian of 
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County on April 3,2008. 
2. ME&LS filed a Notice of Appeal on April 8,2008. 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on May 25,2009 
ruling that the Order and Judgment were not final for purposes of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals specified certain language to be used when the District Court 
certifies an order as final. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court must make 
a determination that the operative facts underlying the claims to be appealed are separate and distinct 
from those on which the remaining claims are based. 
4. This Court issued a Minute Entry on September 21, 2010 finding that the 
"Order and Judgment, issued and entered on April 3, 2008, is a final order on Defendants' 
counterclaim for declaratory relief." The Minute Entry was intended to be the Order of the Court. 
5. This Order modifies the Minute Entry and is intended to certify the Order and 
Judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
this Court makes the express direction for entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
2 
all of the claims or parties in this action. The Court hereby determines that the Order and Judgment 
entered April 3,2008 was and is intended to be final under Rule 54(b), The Court also determines 
that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the Order and Judgment. 
6. This Court also makes the determination that the operative facts underlying 
the adjudicated claims are separate and distinct from those underlying the claims which remain in the 
District Court. The operative facts relating to Bennett's Counterclaim, in this action on which the 
Order and Judgment is based, are summarized as follows: 
a. The language of the ME&LS Operating Agreement and its 
amendments. 
b. The history of ME&LS and its relationship with McNeil 
Engineering, Inc. ("MEI"). 
c. The voluntary nature of Bennett's resignation. 
d. The payments to members and the changes of ownership in 
ME&LS after Bennett's resignation. 
7. By contrast, the claims of the Plaintiffs which remain in the District Court are 
based upon a distinctly different set of operative facts, which are summarized as follows: 
a. Bennett's subsequent establishment of a competing 
engineering firm, and whether his conduct before and after 
departure breached duties to ME&LS or the Operating 
Agreement of ME&LS. 
b. Bennett's interactions with the Engcad entities set up to 
outsource drafting work to the Philippines, and whether his 
conduct interfered with ME&LS' business relationship with 
Engcad or breached duties to Engcad. 
c. Bennett's subsequent use of ME&LS' design practices, tools, 
and procedures, and whether such conduct is a 
misappropriation of trade secrets. 
d. Whether the logo and slogan of Bennett's new company 
infringe upon the rights of ME&LS and MEL 
3 
8. Based on the foregoing, ihis Court certifies the Order and Judgment of April 3, 
2008 as final for all purposes under Rule 54(b), as described above. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this J j d a y of October, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: > . 
HOWORA¥LE CcS-v^fr 
THIRD DISfraCT COURT-JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MART1NEAU 
RYiED L. MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on this day of October, 2010, to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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299 South Main Street 
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E-Mail: Matthew-Barneck(3),rbmn.com 
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Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC; McNEIL 
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, 
LLC; and SCOTT McNEIL, an individual, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND 
LAND SURVEYFNG, LLC; BENCHMARK 
CAD SERVICES, LLC; LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC; and 
DALE K. BENNETT, an individual; 
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an individual, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 050917315 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Defendants and Counter Claimants. 
Counterclaim Defendant McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC 
("ME&LS"), pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby gives 
notice that it appeals the Amended Order Certifying Order and Judgment as Final entered in this 
matter on October 17, 2010, along with interim orders of the Court which led to that final Order, 
including the Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered December 21,2006, the Order on Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Reconsideration Re: Bennett's Membership in ME&LS entered April 2, 2008, the Order and 
Judgment entered April 3,2008, the Minute Entry entered January 19,2010, and the Minute Entry 
entered September 21,2010, 
The Court from which the appeal is taken is the Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 050917315, assigned to the Honorable LA, Dever. The 
appeal is taken to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102, subject to 
possible assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
In connection with a previous appeal, ME&LS posted a bond for costs on appeal in 
the amount of $300 pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That appeal was 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and no costs were awarded. The District Court's official docket in 
this matter shows that the cost bond remains posted with the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, ME&LS 
believes the existing cost bond satisfies the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 6 in connection with 
this Notice of Appeal. 
DATED this W_ day of October, 2010. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
PAUL P. BURGHARDT 
Attorneys for McNeil Engineering 
and Land Surveying, LLC 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first class and postage prepaid, on October^ 2010, to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Keith A. Call, Esq. 
Derek J. Williams, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
PX). Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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